Read more: David Cameron's pure failure
Cameron once said he wanted to be Prime Minister because he thought he’d “be good at it.” In the aftermath of the EU referendum and his resignation as Prime Minister, and now as MP for Witney, his failures loom larger than his successes; but his achievements as a Conservative moderniser were not negligible.
In 2005, Cameron’s fellow candidate for the Conservative leadership David Davis tried to paint himself as the “conviction politician”—and Cameron as the lightweight newcomer. Davis had commitments to a raft of “Thatcherite” policies: tax cuts, grammar schools, renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU. Cameron’s pitch was more about style than the substance of policy; he didn’t want to commit to too much years before the next General Election. But the clear message his style conveyed was that of a moderniser and a “compassionate Conservative.”
Well before Theresa May warned the Conservatives at their 2002 conference about their image as the “nasty party,” others had made similar arguments. Ian Taylor, formerly MP for Esher and Walton, argued in 2000 that to win an election, the party needed to stop being “defined by who we hate—the euro, the EU, asylum-seekers, gays and criminals.” The recognition that the party needed to change did not originate with Cameron, but he did address it head-on, and shaped his image accordingly.
He won the leadership in 2005, first because right-wing Conservative MPs were divided over whether to support Liam Fox or David Davis, and, second, because MPs and the party in the country realised that Cameron’s modernising image was more popular among voters, that he had more chance of beating Gordon Brown (expected to become Prime Minister before the next General Election), and that he had a better chance of holding the party together (as suggested by divisions between Fox and Davis). Given Conservative Party MPs’ and members’ well-known ability to put the desire to win elections above most other considerations, they voted for Cameron to modernise the party, to hold it together, and above all, to win.
This modernisation was a significant driver of Cameron’s electoral success—partial in 2010 and complete in 2015. And his achievements as a moderniser are significant. The foremost symbol of this was probably the introduction of same-sex marriage, which Cameron fought hard for in 2012-13, when it was opposed by many of his party members and MPs (only 40 per cent of Conservative MPs supported the bill in the final vote on it).
Cameron’s attitude to grammar schools—today a totemic issue as May comes out in favour of their expansion—was another key modernising issue. In one of his first speeches as leader he dismissed the idea of expanding grammar schools, as well as the “pupil passport” to subsidise private school fees, insisting education policy must remain focused on driving up standards across the board. In government, this meant a ramping up of New Labour’s academies and the introduction of new (and controversial) free schools. Cameron resisted pressure to put grammar schools back on the table, even when UKIP began to trumpet its support for them. Though education policy under his leadership was not an unqualified success, he ensured that the party could not be accused of nostalgia, or of reaching for old policies, on this ground.
Cameron was also a key supporter of the commitment to meet the target of spending 0.7 per cent of GDP on international development, made in the Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto, and a symbol of compassion and outward-looking, humanitarian international commitments. It was achieved in 2013 (when expenditure reached £11.4 billion), and enshrined in law in 2015. And Cameron’s instinctively moral response to the publication of the Saville report into Bloody Sunday was an example of his leadership at its best. The Ministry of Defence had been implacably opposed to an apology; but while not denigrating the entirety of the British military operation in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007, Cameron unreservedly admitted that the events of Bloody Sunday were “unjustified and unjustifiable … wrong … a catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland.” Ultimately, this laid the groundwork for the first visit of a British monarch to the Republic of Ireland since the Irish war of independence, with the Queen’s visit to Dublin in 2011.
Other achievements can also be seen as part of an overall vision for the Conservative Party as forward-looking and modern. Cameron and Osborne’s interest in developing “tech city” in East London is one such ambition. The commitment to open government in Britain and to the promotion of transparency and accountability around the world, largely spearheaded by Francis Maude while at the Cabinet Office, is another.
Alongside successes were numerous failures. In many areas, Cameron’s modernising rhetoric was not fulfilled. In healthcare, his insistence that he understood the importance of the NHS was not matched by the funding needed to tackle the growing crisis in health and social care, and Andrew Lansley’s reorganisation of the health service was generally seen as disastrous. Ken Clarke, in his brief tenure as justice secretary, promised to cut prison numbers, but was swiftly moved out of the post, and any further attempts to cut prison numbers have largely been driven by budget cuts, rather than by an appreciation of the evidence that prison simply doesn’t work. The jury is still out on new reforms announced by Michael Gove in 2016.
Cameron’s “vote blue, go green” agenda was swiftly undermined. The housing crisis largely got worse. Universal Credit may bring some benefits to people struggling to keep out of poverty, but this will depend on how high or low entitlements are set, and its roll-out has been chaotic. In Libya, planning for after the revolution in 2011 was not a success and on Syria, Cameron and William Hague were defeated by parliament and unable to make the military intervention they argued was vital on humanitarian grounds in 2013.
Cameron and Osborne’s record on the economy will long be hotly contested: there were successes in GDP growth and unemployment figures, but the abandonment of other (supposedly vital) targets, notably the pledge to eliminate the structural deficit within the 2010-15 parliament. The greatest achievement of Cameron and Osborne’s economic plan was probably their success in shaping the narrative of the financial crisis’s causes, and creating an image of their government as unswervingly committed to “Plan A” even as bits of it were being junked.
It was impossible for Cameron to convert the entirety of his party to a more positive stance on the EU. Thatcher’s legacy (even though she had been a supporter of the European project for most of the 1980s) was a hardcore of Eurosceptic Tory MPs. Europe, and, more immediately, Cameron’s need to hold together the party caused his downfall. With UKIP taking support from both the Conservative and Labour parties in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, and with much of the press firmly opposed to the EU, Cameron conceded in 2013 to MPs’ demands for a referendum. This was the political gamble which Cameron will probably be judged most harshly for in the history books.
He thought he could win—as he did in the 2011 referendum on the Alternative Vote, and the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence—and solidify his leadership. But “project fear” did not work well enough in 2016 to win the day for the “Remain” camp, not least because Cameron allowed the referendum to take place when the EU was mired in economic and refugee crises.
Leaving the EU looks set to damage the UK economy; it will probably undermine both British trade opportunities and worker rights and wages. The peace process in Northern Ireland and the Union with Scotland are both profoundly threatened by its consequences. The tone it sets, and the message it sends to our European neighbours about Britain’s attitude to the most ambitious project ever conceived to end future wars in Europe, are profoundly depressing. This failure will continue to loom large over Cameron’s legacy. That is understandable. But we should not forget the former PM’s achievements—there were plenty of them.
Theresa May was one of the most high-profile MPs to call for the Tory Party to change its image early on in the 2000s. She will not want to get rid of all Cameron’s modernising policies or rhetoric. From her first speech as a candidate for the leadership, she put social mobility, insecurity, the cost of living for “ordinary working-class families” and fighting “burning injustices” centre-stage. This picks up on some of the themes of Cameroon compassion. But the Brexit referendum, and May’s swift reversal of Cameron’s grammar-school policy, demonstrates that that modernisation did not put down many deep roots in the party, and elements of it may be swiftly ditched.
Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite is a lecturer in twentieth century British history at UCL and co-editor of Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy
Cameron once said he wanted to be Prime Minister because he thought he’d “be good at it.” In the aftermath of the EU referendum and his resignation as Prime Minister, and now as MP for Witney, his failures loom larger than his successes; but his achievements as a Conservative moderniser were not negligible.
In 2005, Cameron’s fellow candidate for the Conservative leadership David Davis tried to paint himself as the “conviction politician”—and Cameron as the lightweight newcomer. Davis had commitments to a raft of “Thatcherite” policies: tax cuts, grammar schools, renegotiating the UK’s relationship with the EU. Cameron’s pitch was more about style than the substance of policy; he didn’t want to commit to too much years before the next General Election. But the clear message his style conveyed was that of a moderniser and a “compassionate Conservative.”
Well before Theresa May warned the Conservatives at their 2002 conference about their image as the “nasty party,” others had made similar arguments. Ian Taylor, formerly MP for Esher and Walton, argued in 2000 that to win an election, the party needed to stop being “defined by who we hate—the euro, the EU, asylum-seekers, gays and criminals.” The recognition that the party needed to change did not originate with Cameron, but he did address it head-on, and shaped his image accordingly.
He won the leadership in 2005, first because right-wing Conservative MPs were divided over whether to support Liam Fox or David Davis, and, second, because MPs and the party in the country realised that Cameron’s modernising image was more popular among voters, that he had more chance of beating Gordon Brown (expected to become Prime Minister before the next General Election), and that he had a better chance of holding the party together (as suggested by divisions between Fox and Davis). Given Conservative Party MPs’ and members’ well-known ability to put the desire to win elections above most other considerations, they voted for Cameron to modernise the party, to hold it together, and above all, to win.
This modernisation was a significant driver of Cameron’s electoral success—partial in 2010 and complete in 2015. And his achievements as a moderniser are significant. The foremost symbol of this was probably the introduction of same-sex marriage, which Cameron fought hard for in 2012-13, when it was opposed by many of his party members and MPs (only 40 per cent of Conservative MPs supported the bill in the final vote on it).
Cameron’s attitude to grammar schools—today a totemic issue as May comes out in favour of their expansion—was another key modernising issue. In one of his first speeches as leader he dismissed the idea of expanding grammar schools, as well as the “pupil passport” to subsidise private school fees, insisting education policy must remain focused on driving up standards across the board. In government, this meant a ramping up of New Labour’s academies and the introduction of new (and controversial) free schools. Cameron resisted pressure to put grammar schools back on the table, even when UKIP began to trumpet its support for them. Though education policy under his leadership was not an unqualified success, he ensured that the party could not be accused of nostalgia, or of reaching for old policies, on this ground.
Cameron was also a key supporter of the commitment to meet the target of spending 0.7 per cent of GDP on international development, made in the Conservatives’ 2010 manifesto, and a symbol of compassion and outward-looking, humanitarian international commitments. It was achieved in 2013 (when expenditure reached £11.4 billion), and enshrined in law in 2015. And Cameron’s instinctively moral response to the publication of the Saville report into Bloody Sunday was an example of his leadership at its best. The Ministry of Defence had been implacably opposed to an apology; but while not denigrating the entirety of the British military operation in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 2007, Cameron unreservedly admitted that the events of Bloody Sunday were “unjustified and unjustifiable … wrong … a catastrophe for the people of Northern Ireland.” Ultimately, this laid the groundwork for the first visit of a British monarch to the Republic of Ireland since the Irish war of independence, with the Queen’s visit to Dublin in 2011.
Other achievements can also be seen as part of an overall vision for the Conservative Party as forward-looking and modern. Cameron and Osborne’s interest in developing “tech city” in East London is one such ambition. The commitment to open government in Britain and to the promotion of transparency and accountability around the world, largely spearheaded by Francis Maude while at the Cabinet Office, is another.
Alongside successes were numerous failures. In many areas, Cameron’s modernising rhetoric was not fulfilled. In healthcare, his insistence that he understood the importance of the NHS was not matched by the funding needed to tackle the growing crisis in health and social care, and Andrew Lansley’s reorganisation of the health service was generally seen as disastrous. Ken Clarke, in his brief tenure as justice secretary, promised to cut prison numbers, but was swiftly moved out of the post, and any further attempts to cut prison numbers have largely been driven by budget cuts, rather than by an appreciation of the evidence that prison simply doesn’t work. The jury is still out on new reforms announced by Michael Gove in 2016.
Cameron’s “vote blue, go green” agenda was swiftly undermined. The housing crisis largely got worse. Universal Credit may bring some benefits to people struggling to keep out of poverty, but this will depend on how high or low entitlements are set, and its roll-out has been chaotic. In Libya, planning for after the revolution in 2011 was not a success and on Syria, Cameron and William Hague were defeated by parliament and unable to make the military intervention they argued was vital on humanitarian grounds in 2013.
Cameron and Osborne’s record on the economy will long be hotly contested: there were successes in GDP growth and unemployment figures, but the abandonment of other (supposedly vital) targets, notably the pledge to eliminate the structural deficit within the 2010-15 parliament. The greatest achievement of Cameron and Osborne’s economic plan was probably their success in shaping the narrative of the financial crisis’s causes, and creating an image of their government as unswervingly committed to “Plan A” even as bits of it were being junked.
It was impossible for Cameron to convert the entirety of his party to a more positive stance on the EU. Thatcher’s legacy (even though she had been a supporter of the European project for most of the 1980s) was a hardcore of Eurosceptic Tory MPs. Europe, and, more immediately, Cameron’s need to hold together the party caused his downfall. With UKIP taking support from both the Conservative and Labour parties in the run-up to the 2015 General Election, and with much of the press firmly opposed to the EU, Cameron conceded in 2013 to MPs’ demands for a referendum. This was the political gamble which Cameron will probably be judged most harshly for in the history books.
He thought he could win—as he did in the 2011 referendum on the Alternative Vote, and the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence—and solidify his leadership. But “project fear” did not work well enough in 2016 to win the day for the “Remain” camp, not least because Cameron allowed the referendum to take place when the EU was mired in economic and refugee crises.
Leaving the EU looks set to damage the UK economy; it will probably undermine both British trade opportunities and worker rights and wages. The peace process in Northern Ireland and the Union with Scotland are both profoundly threatened by its consequences. The tone it sets, and the message it sends to our European neighbours about Britain’s attitude to the most ambitious project ever conceived to end future wars in Europe, are profoundly depressing. This failure will continue to loom large over Cameron’s legacy. That is understandable. But we should not forget the former PM’s achievements—there were plenty of them.
Theresa May was one of the most high-profile MPs to call for the Tory Party to change its image early on in the 2000s. She will not want to get rid of all Cameron’s modernising policies or rhetoric. From her first speech as a candidate for the leadership, she put social mobility, insecurity, the cost of living for “ordinary working-class families” and fighting “burning injustices” centre-stage. This picks up on some of the themes of Cameroon compassion. But the Brexit referendum, and May’s swift reversal of Cameron’s grammar-school policy, demonstrates that that modernisation did not put down many deep roots in the party, and elements of it may be swiftly ditched.
Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite is a lecturer in twentieth century British history at UCL and co-editor of Renewal: A Journal of Social Democracy
