Westminster attack: A leaderless jihad?

The shocking events in Westminster yesterday are gradually becoming clearer: a lone attacker drove down Westminster bridge, mowing down passers-by with his Hyundai and killing at least two of them. The driver slammed into the iron railings at the perimeter of the Palace of Westminster and ran into the compound wielding a knife. He stabbed, fatally, a policeman before being shot by armed officers seconds later. The attacker died at the scene: it is hard to imagine another outcome from a solo, unsophisticated attack on one of the most heavily protected buildings in the world. The tragic murder of PC Keith Palmer, teacher Aysha Frade and another unidentified member of the public does not alter the fact that parliamentary security worked. To underline this point, parliament will sit today, less than 24 hours after the initial attack.

Whilst the police have announced several arrests, a spokesman for them stated: “this attacker acted alone and was inspired by international terrorism.” The technique used was gruesomely familiar from previous attacks across Europe using vehicles to mow down pedestrians and a knife to assault police. The technique of low-tech terror is a hallmark of Islamic State (IS) and presents a sharp change from Al-Qaeda (AQ)’s preference for complex spectaculars. The spectaculars involve large teams, require technical skills such as bomb-making or being able to pilot a plane and are therefore prone to being discovered by the security services or failing at the implementation phase. For every 9/11 and 7/7, there were terrorist failures: the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot to blow planes out of the sky using liquid bombs, or the 21/7 abortive tube bombing in which the suicide vests failed to detonate.

The unsophistication of the Westminster attacks leads to one of the biggest questions in counter-terrorism thinking: the degree to which the “lone wolf” low-tech attacks are nonetheless directed from an organisational hierarchy with IS. A similar debate raged in the late 2000s over AQ’s approach: was there a central organisation directing attacks across the world, or was this jihad “leaderless”: a movement of individuals and separate groups inspired by AQ’s ideology but not part of a command structure? The same question now applies with IS: are individuals becoming radicalised and deciding to carry out attacks or are they being directed by IS’s foreign security organisation (Amn al-Kharji)?

Too often this debate is politicised, with those that call for tighter security measures pushing the “centralised control” argument and those sceptical of state security shrugging their shoulders and concluding that you can’t stop a lone wolf. The truth is, as ever, somewhere in between: an individual may be radicalised and inspired by IS and may be encouraged to carry out an attack, but that does not mean that the attack is resourced and directed from Raqqa. Furthermore, the range of influences on impressionable, would-be militants are not limited to IS. AQ’s most vigorous chapter, the Yemen branch known as AQAP has put together a range of propaganda material on becoming the “lone mujahid.” In January, elements associated with AQAP made a call to attack London's parliament alongside a release of material made by AQAP's deceased radicaliser in chief Anwar al-Awlaqi. There is no suggestion that AQAP has the capacity to launch direct attacks from Yemen on Westminster, but its ideological and propaganda reach is considerable.

The arrests in the past 12 hours demonstrate that this attacker who “acted alone” did not exist in a bubble. He would have had friends, associates and social networks. Whether any or some of these had foreknowledge of his intentions is unknown at this stage. What is important is that people who perceive a risk from someone becoming increasingly radicalised feel able to share their concerns with the authorities. Some self-appointed “community leaders” have argued that Muslims don’t trust the police as a result of feeling targeted by counter-terrorism strategies. The case of Andrew Ibrahim was an early indication that the opposite may be the case: elders at his mosque approached the authorities in response to concerns at his increasingly angry and radical behaviour. As ever, the strongest protection against radicalisation is a society that unites around its interests and values.