What would America gain from a Cuban friendship?

If the narrative of 2014 has been of the United States constantly reacting to events, last week brought a sharp rebuttal: an announcement from the White House that American policy towards Cuba would undergo its most significant change in 60 years. Barack Obama’s statement on Wednesday—accompanied by a prisoner exchange and a simultaneous if much less formal broadcast from Cuban president Raul Castro—that the two countries would normalize diplomatic relations means that the White House is ending the year on its own terms. Like so much of American foreign policy, this change has already proven controversial. Members of Congress from both parties have condemned the change as a bad deal which empowers a long-standing American adversary. And there have been loud condemnations from the Cuban émigré population in Florida, which has historically been fiercely anti-Castro. The argument for the continuation of American policy towards Cuba has always been that it weakened the Castro regime, which has an indisputably poor human rights record. But while the embargo has succeeded in undermining the Cuban economy, it has had little discernible impact politically. The Castro brothers have demonstrated remarkable political longevity; there is scant evidence that their grip on power was likely to slip. Furthermore, Cuba would hardly be the only undemocratic country with diplomatic ties to the United States. As Obama observed in his statement, the US has developed an increasingly close relationship with Vietnam, another one party, purportedly communist republic and notable Cold War foe. Nor would it be easy to argue that America only deals with democratic and open regimes when its allies includes states like Thailand, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The shift in policy will give the United States an opportunity to reinvigorate some of its relationships across Latin America. Cuba has a strong network of allies across the Caribbean and throughout Central and South America, and has been influential in the development of regional groupings and institutions which explicitly exclude the United States. Even though Cuban and American interests are likely to remain at odds on regional trade and security policies for the foreseeable future, the establishment of direct diplomatic ties will create space for discussion and even collaboration on areas of common concern, such as humanitarian and counter-narcotics efforts. However, it remains to be seen whether Congress will follow Obama’s lead. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 is still on the books and tightly controls investment and business in Cuba; Obama cannot override it without Congressional assent. But by the same token, Congress can do little to overturn the president’s executive actions. Some members of Congress have indicated that they would propose cutting the State Department’s budget if it opens an embassy in Havana, but such a measure is unlikely to pass, and even unlikelier to surmount Obama’s veto. One possible scenario would see the Senate refusing to confirm an ambassador to Cuba, which would be embarrassing but not fatal to the endeavour of re-starting diplomacy. Fundamentally, though, the domestic politics of Cuba policy have changed. While the Cuban voting bloc in Florida remains staunchly opposed to any relaxation of relations, younger voters and non-Cuban Latinos are relatively ambivalent and are more likely to vote on broader questions of national policy. Obama carried Florida in both 2008 and 2012 despite being no one’s idea of a hawk with regard to Cuba. But come 2016, Cuba policy will likely be a central issue again in the state, especially if the Republican candidate is the pro-embargo, Spanish-speaking former governor Jeb Bush. Hillary Clinton, the likely Democratic nominee, has spoken in favour of lifting the embargo, though she has also demonstrated an ability to put distance between herself and Obama when necessary and will not hesitate to do so again should the new Cuba policy prove especially unpopular. But to Obama, with no elections left to contest, these considerations have become largely academic. In their final two years, presidents often turn to foreign policy as domestic audiences become increasingly fatigued. Obama is no different: having suffered electoral defeat in the midterms and with no real chance of passing any more major legislation, he is now applying himself to issues on which he can take action relatively free of Congressional constraint. The package of reforms announced by the White House last week was comprehensive, covering diplomatic, trade, visa and communications issues. It remains to be seen how these reforms will be carried out in practice, how they will be reciprocated by the Cuban government and the extent to which Congress will interfere. But overturning a policy which has stood for 60 years was never going to be simple. Obama may have taken the initiative, but he still must manage to keep the process on track for the next two years. If he can do so, the momentum of growing economic and social ties between the two nations—and Raul Castro’s announced retirement in 2018—will make it very difficult for his successor in the White House to resume the policy of isolation.