Politics

What did Albert Reynolds do for the Irish peace process?

The former Taoiseach took undervalued steps to bring about peace

August 22, 2014
The tricolor flies at half mast at Government Buildings in Dublin, following the announcement of Albert Reynolds's death. © Brian Lawless/PA Wire/Press Association Images
The tricolor flies at half mast at Government Buildings in Dublin, following the announcement of Albert Reynolds's death. © Brian Lawless/PA Wire/Press Association Images
Albert Reynolds, who died yesterday, was often underestimated during his lifetime . A self-made man who built a pet food empire and loved big hats and country music, Reynolds was an arch-pragmatist, without whose work for peace as Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) between 1992 and 1994, the 1990s Irish peace process would never have achieved as much as it did. Here, we run through Reynolds's three key contributions.

Improved relations with Westminster

Former British Prime Minister John Major paid tribute to Reynolds when told about his death, describing theirs as “a relationship unlike any other that I had during my time in government.” The two men knew each other from before either was in a top job; they were both Finance Ministers at the same time (Reynolds was the Irish Minister for Finance 1988-91, Major was British Chancellor 1989-90). Dr Margaret O'Callaghan, a historian at Queen's University Belfast, speculates that the two may have felt an affinity; they were unsophisticated outsiders in the political classes of their respective countries. Whatever the foundation of it, Reynolds's relationship with Major was closer than those his predecessors Charles Haughey and Garret FitzGerald had with Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher, says O'Callaghan, was ideologically committed to British Unionism, while her Irish counterparts, if not exactly ideologues, were intellectuals with big ideas, less willing to compromise. What Major and Reynolds shared was a willingness to work together to get things done.

Paved the way for the 1998 Good Friday Agreement

The 1993 “Downing Street Declaration,” issued by Major and Reynolds following months of negotiations, set in stone the principle that Ireland would not be unified unless all its population wanted a union. As the historian Lord Bew put it on BBC Radio 4’s Today: “You can have any settlement you want, as long as it's based on consent.” O'Callaghan says that the declaration “changed the terms of the debate”: its focus was on ending violence before negotiating the precise detail of future plans for Ireland, rather than the other way around. The declaration recognises that addressing the relationship between opposing factions within Northern Ireland and between Northern Ireland and the Republic was a necessary precursor to peace. This, Callaghan says, was characteristic of Reynolds's pragmatic approach. Without the Downing Street Declaration, which stated that Northern Irish Protestants could not be forced to secede from Britain if they didn't want to, the Good Friday Agreement, which removed the Republic of Ireland's constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, could not have happened.

Fostered a spirit of inclusiveness

John Hume, former leader of the moderate Northern Irish Social Democratic and Labour Party, is widely recognised as having helped foster goodwill between Republicans and Unionists during the 80s and 90s. From 1988, the unionist Hume was dealing directly with republican Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams, seeking to find a way in which the two opposing forces of Irish politics could work toward a common goal. But, says O'Callaghan, Hume needed backing at the highest level for his ideas to be taken seriously. He only got this when Reynolds, who was willing to trust Hume, became Taoiseach. The spirit of inclusiveness fostered by Hume's talks was central to the ongoing peace process—Hume was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1998 alongside former Irish First Minister David Trimble.