The past is usually the best guide to the future, and never more so than on the newly topical issue of the UK’s prospects of rejoining the European Union. The historical lesson is simple: rejoining can be done very quickly—in a matter of months—if the political will exists on both sides of the negotiating table. But it can’t be done at all if one side is not politically aligned with the other.
Both propositions are borne out by the experience of Britain’s first three attempts to join the European Economic Community (EEC), as it was then called, between 1961 and 1973. The first two attempts failed, after exhaustive formal and informal negotiation. This was not because of the tortuous detail of trade policy, or even big-ticket items like the British contribution to the European budget, but because the French president, Charles de Gaulle, vetoed UK membership for political reasons. On both occasions, he didn’t want Britain competing with France and Germany—especially France—for the leadership of Europe.
Then de Gaulle resigned in 1969. A year later, Edward Heath restarted the UK’s third membership application to the EEC. France’s new president, Georges Pompidou, wanted the UK to join, as did Germany’s chancellor, Willy Brandt. This time it took only 19 months of negotiations to agree a full treaty of accession, and then a further year for the necessary legislation to pass through parliament. The whole process of joining took barely two-and-half years.
Ah, but weren’t the issues simpler then, with no Euro single currency or Schengen passport-free travel zone? Far from it. UK trade in the 1960s was heavily skewed to its former empire. There were hugely complex negotiations about the treatment of imports to the UK and Europe—particularly agricultural products—from Commonwealth countries, which previously benefitted from preferential trade rules. By contrast, contemporary Britain’s trade and regulatory system remains closely aligned with the EU, shaped by nearly 50 years of previous membership and fairly minimal changes since Brexit.
As for the Euro and Schengen, the UK is likely to want to stay out of both. And so it can, if the EU is content for that to happen. This is a straightforwardly political decision. It turns on whether France, Germany and the other major EU states want the UK in or out. These matters would probably be agreed even before formal negotiations begin, as a clear statement of political intent by both sides.
That’s not to say that there won’t be genuinely difficult hurdles to overcome, even with strong political will for the UK to rejoin. The biggest bone of contention will likely be the size of the British contribution to the EU budget. The two sides will haggle over a difference of many billions, and anti-European politicians and British media will declare giving in to any agreed figure to be a selling out. A lot depends upon a prospective UK government winning a public argument that the budget contribution is the necessary price for equal access to the single market, generating many times more than that sum in extra trade, business and tax receipts.
Free movement of people will be another tricky issue, given concerns about immigration. But I doubt this would be a deal-breaker. Maybe it will be possible to negotiate a longish phasing-in of a complete return to free movement. Either way, I suspect the issue will be less salient than in the Brexit debate of 2016, given that Poles and eastern Europeans are no longer queuing up to work abroad, particularly as far away as the UK, now that their economies have radically strengthened.
The benefits of the EU dropping its onerous post-Brexit travel bureaucracy and settlement restrictions would also be a big plus, given the post-Brexit experience of EU travel and residence becoming steadily more difficult. A Rejoin government should mobilise the huge constituency of British tourists and business travellers to Europe to make the argument that free movement is a two-way street, of benefit to Brits as much as EU residents.
The big question, then, is whether in five or 10 years’ time there might indeed be sufficient political will on both sides to see the UK rejoin.
I obviously can’t supply an answer, except to note that the idea is clearly gathering steam. Equally striking is the generally benign continental view of Britain, despite Brexit, which has been bolstered by common action in support of Ukraine.
However, one point seems fairly clear. A referendum, as well as an election, would almost certainly be required before any Rejoin deal could be negotiated. I doubt any future UK government would even start formal Rejoin negotiations without a referendum. This is not least because future EU leaders would be highly unlikely to be prepared to do so without a decisive British referendum mandate, making a second Brexit unlikely.
For a Rejoin referendum to be won—or even winnable—two conditions would need to be met: a British government firmly committed to Rejoin, and European partners prepared to support the idea and to indicate the broad outlines of a deal, including the opt-outs from the Euro and Schengen. So there is a long way to go yet from Andy Burnham’s tentative floating of options to move Britain closer to Europe.
