One supposed feature of the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom is that it is ministers and not officials who are responsible for the workings of government. When things go wrong, the theory goes, it is the politician in charge and not his or her civil servants who are held accountable. Advisers advise, goes the dictum, but ministers decide.
Yet the last few years have seen a spate of high-profile examples where officials and not ministers have taken the fall. In February 2020, the then senior Home Office civil servant resigned citing a “a vicious and orchestrated briefing campaign” and sued for constructive dismissal. In September 2022, the then senior official at the Treasury was removed. In February 2026, the then cabinet secretary stepped down early with a negotiated settlement, and four months later the then senior Foreign Office civil servant was summarily sacked.
In each case, the manner of departure had its own facts, but the departures all had a common feature. The career official left after ministerial displeasure. There had been perceived failures within government and it was the official, and not the minister, who had to go. Advisers took the dive, and ministers survived—at least for a while.
The four incidents were in four different government departments. Indeed, they were under the so-called four great offices of state. They were also not just under one political party. The first two examples happened under Conservative governments, and second two under the current Labour administration. Indeed, the incidents were under three different prime ministers.
These variations indicate that the issue is not about any one political party or the competence (or otherwise) of any single politician or group of politicians. It is a cross-party, cross-departmental phenomenon. In short, the removals point to a broader political trend.
The removals have been strikingly expensive. The departing Home Office official, Philip Rutnam, received a reported settlement of over £340,000. The Treasury official, Tom Scholar, received a reported £457,000. The BBC reported that the departing cabinet secretary Chris Wormald “received [a] pay-off of nearly £860,000”. And the Guardian reported that the payout for the departure of the Foreign Office official Olly Robbins “is believed to be six figures” but perhaps not as much as that for Wormald.
The legalities of what followed each departure varied slightly. Rutnam brought an employment claim and Robbins brought a judicial review. Scholar and Wormald appear to have not needed any formal legal threat. But although the legal means differed, the end results were all expensive settlements.
What does this dataset tell us? What do the four cases say about what is happening in British politics?
One feature of this dataset is how it shows that ministers have sought to extend to government departments the brutal hiring-and-firing that takes place elsewhere in political life. Ministers and opposition spokespeople are freely dismissed and moved, as are special advisers. Few people care about such ups and downs, and the sackings are generally consequence-free for those who enact them. But when this cultural practice is expanded to officials it encounters those with legal protections and union memberships.
The other thing the dataset tells us is that the old theory of ministerial responsibility has broken down in practice. Ministers at the most elevated level now dump on their officials publicly, and then leave the taxpayer to pay the bill. Sadly, however, there is no legal basis for forcing the culpable ministers to indemnify the state for the costs.
How long can our constitutional arrangements continue with the polite political fiction that minsters are responsible for what happens in departments? Presumably, we cannot keep pretending the old model of ministerial accountability remains in place when, under various ministers of both major parties and over four great offices of state, officials are being publicly removed as a method of political expediency.
Of course, such hypocrisy is itself a feature, if not a principle, of British political life. Ministers and officials have advantages in the current system, where each can point to the other. But it is not sustainable, at least not with these levels of payouts. And the next legal claims may not be bought off, and the government could end up with some unwelcome High Court precedents on the extent of ministerial power. We are thereby at a point of political change, if not crisis, in our constitutional arrangements.
One solution to this problem would be to allow officials to be far more directly accountable to parliament and the public, rather than being covered by the cloak of ministerial responsibility. We could then see more starkly where failures are political rather than administrative, and vice versa.
Or we could revert to the classic model where ministers do not diss their officials. But this is unlikely. Ministers appear to have developed a taste for openly blaming their officials—especially as they can get the government to pay the consequential compensation packages.
And so if we are to take the notions of accountability and accountability seriously, then something will have to give. We cannot any longer affect that there is not a serious cross-party, cross-departmental problem here. But unfortunately it does not suit politicians to address the problem, as it would make them more accountable, and not less.
