The United Kingdom does constitutional reform in two ways: gradually, and then suddenly. Years, indeed decades, can pass with quiet piecemeal changes to how the UK is governed: life peerages here, a Police and Criminal Evidence Act there. And then, from time to time, we have concentrated loud spates of reform.
As two of these spates were in the first terms of Labour governments, there is perhaps an expectation that all incoming Labour governments will have a good go at constitutional reform. The government of Clement Attlee after the Second World War pushed through House of Lords reform, accepted self-government for India and formally recognised full Irish independence.
The first administration of Tony Blair after 1997 gave us the Human Rights Act, the Freedom of Information Act, devolution for Scotland and Wales, the Good Friday Agreement, and placed the security forces on a statutory and accountable basis. Blair was to lose interest in constitutional reform, but there was a sense for a while that such things could be done, and that such things could only get better.
In 2024 Keir Starmer became prime minister with a thumping Labour majority. Imagine what could be done over a full term with such power. Any opposition from the Lords could be dealt with well before the five-year term was finished. The state of the United Kingdom could be renovated with time to spare. And as Starmer was a former human rights lawyer, he would especially know how to go about fixing our constitutional roof while the political sun shone.
But: hardly anything. A desultory move was made at reform of the House of Lords—finally ridding the upper house of hereditary peers, as first promised in the 1911 Parliament Act—but that got bogged down and was almost forgotten. It eventually scraped onto the statute book with the expedient of converting many hereditary peers into life peerages. This was not a constitutional bang but a whimper.
Now the Labour government is resetting. There will soon be a new prime minister, likely in the form of Andy Burnham, until recently the mayor of Greater Manchester. And it is still only 2026—two years into a five-year term. There is still time to face down the House of Lords if need be. Will this mean a spate of constitutional reform?
Maybe. Burnham has a record of supporting devolution and proportional representation. Part of this, of course, was to be expected in a politician with a regional power base, where an anti-Westminster sensibility makes sense.
But the commitment does seem sincere. He made a point of supporting proportional representation as recently as his byelection win in Makerfield. Burnham told the Observer last month, “I am committed to proportional representation. I think it would change the political culture. I don’t see how first past the post and the point-scoring inherent within it lifts Britain out of the doom loop it is in.”
Burnham seems similarly sincere in his belief in local devolution. The UK—and England especially—has a centralised state where (in both legal theory and political practice) local authorities are merely statutory corporations subject to the ultimate controls of Westminster and Whitehall. Shifting this centralised model into something where councils have genuine autonomy will not be easy, or quick.
According to the Economist, Burnham “wants local councils to gain greater power to build social housing and to control education policy. He thinks every part of England should have a similar devolution deal to his own region, Greater Manchester; the government should be legally barred from taking decisions that affect them without their getting a formal say.”
Things often look very different once a politician becomes a minister in Whitehall. The Treasury and other departments will not happily concede power to public authorities that will place those authorities beyond Whitehall’s control. If Burnham does want to achieve meaningful local autonomy then it will take a lot of time and energy both in planning and execution. But time and energy will be scarce resources.
One further problem is that proportional representation was not in the 2024 Labour Manifesto, and devolution to the English regions mentioned only in the vaguest of terms. This means that if any fundamental changes are opposed in the House of Lords, the government may not be able claim any electoral mandate to force them through.
Burnham is likely to prioritise health, education and other social policies. He will also have to deal with demands for substantial increases in defence spending. Quite soon constitutional reform will become a nice-to-have rather than a pressing priority. Other than changes such as moving some administrative functions to Manchester, it is unlikely that constitutional reforms such as devolution and proportional representation will be uppermost on his legislative agenda.
And devolution and proportional representation are not the only constitutional reforms needed. As this column has previously set out, there needs to be a general reform of delegated legislation and wider ministerial powers, not least because the UK faces a real prospect of an incoming illiberal government that will want to push executive powers to (and beyond) their legal limits.
The problem with constitutional reform being done either in a piecemeal or an accelerated form is that there is too often good reason for governments to do something else instead. The reset of the current Labour government under Burnham faces immense international and economic challenges, with public services weak across the board. If he makes constitutional reform an actual priority that will be a refreshing part of the reset, but it seems unlikely.
Given the lack of mention of constitutional reform in the 2024 Labour manifesto, it may well be that such issues are postponed to after the next general election. By which time, of course, it may then be too late.
