World

It's mainly Nato and the EU who care about the war in Ukraine

For much of the rest of the world it’s not such a big deal

May 09, 2022
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Modi’s government is unwilling to do anything to which Russia might take exception. Photo: Abaca Press / Alamy Stock Photo

For the countries of Nato and the EU, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a cataclysmic event: not just because of its brutality, but because it led to a re-think of their whole approach to security on the European continent. For some, Germany for example, it has prompted an embarrassing examination of their past policies towards Russia. For others, like Finland and Sweden, it has meant the abandonment of their previous non-aligned status and a move towards joining Nato. 

The war has been on the front pages of most European and American newspapers. It has dominated social media and public discussion. Pictures of ruined cities and refugees, together with stories of violence, rape, and destruction, have been everywhere. Western public opinion has been moved to support Ukraine.

There are a few other countries where the war has also been at the forefront of political and public attention: Australia, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand, for example. But in the wider world, reactions have been more muted. For many members of the United Nations, what is happening in Ukraine is a European phenomenon, not one in which they themselves take any special interest and certainly not one which affects their own security. 

The UN’s General Assembly, to which all its members belong, has addressed the war in Ukraine on two occasions. On 24th March, it passed a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire and access for humanitarian assistance. On 7th April, it passed a second resolution, suspending Russia’s membership of the UN’s Human Rights Committee. Both were adopted by impressive majorities: 140 to five in the first case, 93 to 24 in the second. 

But equally significant were the number of abstentions. Thirty-eight member states declined to express a view on whether a ceasefire was desirable. Fifty-eight saw no reason to terminate Russia’s membership of the Human Rights Committee. In the case of the Human Rights Committee resolution, all but one of the 10 biggest, by population, countries in the world failed to express support: overall, those who abstained on the two resolutions comprised over half the world’s population.

They also included countries who might have been thought to share the view that invading a fellow sovereign member of the UN was a challenge to the international order in which they themselves had a stake: for example, Bangladesh, Barbados, Brazil, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Thailand, Tunisia, UAE and Tanzania. Nonetheless, they all abstained on one or both resolutions.

The reasons, insofar as their governments offered any, varied. In the case of India it was realpolitik. India has a long-standing political relationship with Russia and is dependent on it for arms supplies. It saw this interest as paramount and was unwilling to do anything to which Russia might take exception. This did not just apply to UN resolutions. India has also reportedly denied permission to Japanese aircraft to land in its territory in order to pick up supplies belonging to the UN. In other cases, like Saudi Arabia, the motive may have been self-serving: a wish not to let membership of the Human Rights Committee be subject to too much scrutiny.

There were also wider factors, namely a disinclination to take sides in an international dispute involving the big powers, particularly if this involves lining up with the United States and its allies. This seems to be the reason why South Africa chose to abstain in both resolutions: its representative said that he would be happy to vote for a ceasefire, but not if it involved any mention of Russia.

There are wider lessons to be drawn from the handling of the Ukraine war in the UN. Commentators often refer to international opinion as if it is synonymous with the views of a limited number of liberal democracies, as if the “end of history” predicted in 1992 by the political philosopher Francis Fukuyama means that we all now share the same set of values. But we don’t. Beyond Nato and the EU, there are only a handful of countries whose political instincts are likely to be identical to ours on most issues. Being a democracy, which both India and South Africa are, does not mean seeing the world the way that Britain does.