Today’s EU-UK summit is historic. It’s the first formal gathering of this group since Brexit, bringing together the president of the European Council António Costa, the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, the EU high representative Kaja Kallas and the British prime minister Keir Starmer. They meet in Lancaster House in extraordinary times.
Europe is under unprecedented threat: from Russia’s war in Ukraine and its wider imperial ambitions; from the United States’s disengagement from European security (at best) and betrayal (at worst); and from far-right forces across the continent, backed by both Russia and the Make America Great Again movement. Europe can address and overcome these interlinked threats if the EU and UK act together. The summit is significant precisely because it’s happening in this dramatic context.
It opens the way for structured cooperation between the EU and the UK on security and defence matters. Ever since Brexit, cooperation in this field was a no-brainer. It is evidence of the phenomenal brainlessness on all sides that such cooperation hasn’t materialised before. The EU and UK share the same strategic outlook, even more so since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And given the UK’s military might—boasting, alongside France, the most capable army in Europe, especially in air and at sea, as well as a nuclear deterrent and developed strategic culture—not exploiting fully the synergies between Brussels and London has been an incredible own goal. As the EU and the UK are drawn closer together by mounting security threats, this is an error we cannot afford.
More specifically, the summit will initiate an EU-UK security and defence partnership modelled on agreements with other EU third countries such as Norway. While the details will be ironed out in the months ahead, the partnership will open the way to the UK’s participation in SAFE: the EU’s proposed €150bn defence fund supporting projects by two or more EU member states or qualifying third countries. The latter include EU candidates or countries with a security and defence partnership with the EU. This partnership doesn’t mean that British companies will directly receive EU grants or loans. But they would be able to participate in multinational defence projects supported financially by the EU.
The summit is also expected to institutionalise regular meetings at head of state, ministerial and senior official levels to guide, develop and implement the security and defence partnership.
The defence industry is only one of the areas of cooperation. The partnership is intended to be broader, including support for Ukraine, the protection of critical infrastructure, maritime security and space.
The agreement is so far vague on details about the ambition of the security and defence relationship between the EU and UK, and how this will impact Europe’s ability to confront existential threats. But it is tremendously important that the discussion has begun.
The contrast between this and the rest of summit’s agenda could not be greater. Alongside security and defence, the summit is expected to cover a range of topics, including fishing, phytosanitary standards, youth mobility, energy, climate and migration. Most of these issues appear embarrassingly minute compared to the big questions of war and peace in Europe. The pettiness caused by Brexit on both sides of the Channel has not disappeared altogether.
The summit is expected to remove friction on trade in animal and plant products, with the UK accepting “dynamic alignment” with EU standards, meaning British legislation will have to follow suit. This includes British acceptance that the European Court of Justice will be the ultimate arbiter of disputes. London is presumably not thrilled about this, but almost a decade after Brexit, it must have realised that the EU’s significantly greater economic power leaves it with no alternative. Brussels (and especially Paris) have also been hard-headed on fishing rights, expecting an indefinite roll-over of current arrangements.
On youth mobility, it is the UK that is rigid, with London reluctant to extend rights to young EU citizens to study and work in Britain, fearing this might be confused and conflated with the heated debate over migration.
Taken individually, each of these disputes has its logic, importance and domestic political salience, especially given the far-right threat. But set against the overall strategic backdrop of the summit, they pale in significance.
The bad news is that short-sightedness and petty politics has not been erased from the EU-UK relationship. The good news is that these differences will probably not stand in the way of the strategic convergence between the two. As many Brits loved repeating after Brexit, the UK has left the EU but it has not left Europe. Almost a decade after the fateful referendum, the EU-UK summit will be the first concrete demonstration that this is true.
