Obama's Vietnam

A popular new president, committed to ambitious domestic reform. A war halfway around the globe, inherited from his predecessor. Generals demanding more troops, predicting defeat if they are denied. The year, 1965, the president, Lyndon Johnson, the war, Vietnam.

Sounds familiar, doesn’t it? Lyndon Johnson in 1965, like Obama today, was dubious about the prospects for victory in his far away war. Nor was he convinced of its geopolitical significance. What persuaded him to send troops—the decision that ultimately destroyed his presidency—was the fear that if he didn’t, his opponents would paint him as militarily weak—as the president who lost Vietnam.

During the campaign, in order to maintain his militaristic bona fides, Barack Obama liked to compare the war in Afghanistan, the “good war,” with the “bad war,” the war in Iraq. He made the point, correctly, that by shifting troops in 2002-2003 for the invasion of Iraq, America took its eye off the ball in Afghanistan.



Today, Obama is trapped by his campaign rhetoric. Pashtun insurgents, angry about the foreign occupation and the corrupt central government again hold sway over large parts of Southern Afghanistan. General McChrystal, the four-star in charge, says that without 40,000 more American boots on the ground, the bad guys will win. If he doesn’t get them, he may well resign, which has the potential to be politically devastating for Obama. But if the president sends in the requested troops and they, like the British and the Russians before them, fail to transform Afghanistan into a viable, tranquil state, and instead come home in an unending stream of body bags, it could destroy Obama’s presidency, as Vietnam did Johnson’s.

Afghanistan is not vital to our security. It is about as far from the US as is possible. Other than opium, it produces hardly anything the rest of the world needs. And al Qaeda, our putative if illusive enemy, isn’t even based in Afghanistan these days. During the cold war, Washington happily consigned Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere of influence (until the 1979 Russian invasion, of course). The notion that terrorists need a distant supply base in order to bomb our subways is silly. 9/11 was planned in Hamburg and Florida, 7/7 in Leeds. It is hard to think of a nation outside central Africa less important to the west.

Moreover, our chances of victory there are dubious. Afghans are some of the fiercest fighters in the world. Its rural, mountainous terrain is designed for defensive warfare. Even at its most stable, even under the king, the central government never really controlled more than the major cities and the ring road connecting them. General McChrystal’s demand for 40,000 more troops does not come with a guarantee of victory. He merely states that without out reinforcements the war “will likely result in failure.”

This does not provide an exit strategy; it only demands a commitment to the security of a country far far away that is utterly open ended.

Investment advisers tell us when considering whether to sell a stock, ask yourself if you would buy it at this price. The only reason to commit more forces to Afghanistan is to justify the forces we have already committed. Thank God Obama is not a fool. He is stalling McChrystal’s demand. I suspect he would rather pay the political costs now than later after he has committed more troops into the quagmire.

The Russians had more troops than Nato will have, even after McChrystal’s extra 40,000. They had trained and dedicated local allies. The Panjshir valley is littered with their tanks, destroyed in nine successive offensives. Their defeat in Afghanistan had more than a little to do with the collapse of the Soviet empire. Let us not make their mistake.

My predictions: in 12-24 months most western forces will have left Afghanistan. The Taliban, hated by the Tajiks and Hazaras, not that loved even by most Pashtuns, will not take Kabul. Power in Afghanistan will remain scattered among a bunch of local warlords. And in 10 years, the neocons, today all up in arms, convinced that if we don’t hold South Waziristan the world will collapse, will be up in arms about something else and none of them will give Afghanistan a second thought.