World

Bullying Pakistan won’t work

Calls for the Trump administration to get tough with Pakistan over its ambivalence toward the Afghan Taliban are misguided and likely to be counterproductive. The country has enough problems with Islamist terror

March 10, 2017
United States President Donald Trump speaks as Secretary of Defense James Mattis looks on ©Olivier Douliery/DPA/PA Images
United States President Donald Trump speaks as Secretary of Defense James Mattis looks on ©Olivier Douliery/DPA/PA Images
Pakistan is in turmoil after a series of terrorist attacks killed more than 130 people in recent weeks. Its government has been quick to react, rounding up suspects and launching a major new paramilitary operation in Punjab. Tensions with the Afghan government also escalated when Pakistan blamed militants in Afghanistan for the attacks and shelled suspected camps across the border.

The new administration of President Donald Trump has largely remained silent throughout, and has yet to present its strategy towards Pakistan or its neighbour, Afghanistan. But, as Trump drags his feet, experts in the US are urging him to crack the whip. Recentarticles in the American press have called for Pakistan to be punished for its support of the Afghan Taliban and similar groups. Frustration has been growing in Congress, too, which restricted military aid last year.

Pakistan has long been accused of aiding the anti-government insurgency in Afghanistan by granting members of the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network sanctuary in its territory. As a result, US pundits have proposed stopping American security assistance to Pakistan entirely, rescinding Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO ally, and even designating the country as a state sponsor of terrorism.

But such draconian measures are unlikely to work and could even backfire.

Coercion has not been particularly successful in the past. As Secretary of Defense James Mattis told Congress in January, attaching conditions to US aid packages has “a mixed history." After 9/11 the Bush administration pressed former president Musharraf to hunt down al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters. Musharraf did help the US capture top al-Qaeda suspects, but he never really targeted the Afghan Taliban (which was to large extent the creation of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI).

Today the Afghan Taliban is at war with the Afghan government, which is allied with Pakistan’s arch-enemy, India. New Delhi is trying to encircle Pakistan, it is believed, by increasing its influence in Kabul. Such fears—some might say paranoia—have determined Pakistani strategic thinking about its neighbour for decades. And they will likely persist, as tensions with India have grown again recently over the disputed region of Kashmir.

The US could impose sanctions on Pakistan. But China and Russia are unlikely to cooperate, limiting the impact of such a move. Besides, American sanctions have failed to change Pakistan’s behaviour in the past. In the 1990s the Clinton administration sanctioned the country for its nuclear activities. But that did not stop Pakistan from testing its first nuclear device in 1998 and now it has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world.

Punishing Pakistan might also provoke retaliation. The US supplies its troops in landlocked Afghanistan via the Pakistani border. Islamabad could deny access, as it did in 2011 after incidents with NATO forces. There are limited options for alternative routes, especially after Russia closed the northern supply network in 2015. And if Trump sends more troops, as General John Nicholson, the newly appointed US commander in Afghanistan, has proposed, the need for supplies will only increase.

Punishing Pakistan could also jeopardise vital counter-terrorism cooperation. Intelligence-sharing between the two countries, which has led to arrests and helped foil plots, may suffer from American bullying. Drone strikes, which have restarted under Trump after a lengthy hiatus, require access to Pakistani airspace. But, if the US designates the country as a state sponsor of terrorism, collaboration on these issues will become impossible.

America would then find it harder to counter the real threat of Pakistani terrorism. Tashfeen Malik, wife of Rizwan Farook, who together killed 16 people in San Bernardino, California in 2015, was originally from Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban, though most of its violence is directed at locals, has attempted to kill Americans, too. In 2010 Faisal Shahzad almost detonated a bomb in New York City. Worse still, Islamic State has been linked to attacks, such as the Sehwan Sufi shrine bombing last month.

America may not need to bully Pakistan, anyway, as its government is already making moves in the right direction. In 2014 the army launched a major offensive in North Waziristan against the Pakistani Taliban and foreign fighters. In early 2015 a National Action Plan was approved outlining various steps to fight militancy, following the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014, the country’s deadliest terrorist attack,  in which 141 people, including 132 schoolchildren, died at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban. And, following the recent bombings, a new army operation, “Radd-ul-Fasaad,” has been started in Punjab province.

That the government is prepared to act so aggressively in Punjab, long a hotbed of state-sponsored militancy, is another sign that prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his hard-charging new military chief, General Qamar Bajwa, mean business. Last year Mumtaz Qadri, the Islamist murderer of former Punjab governor, Salman Taseer, was executed. And Hafez Saeed, the co-founder of anti-Indian militant group Lashkar-e Taiba, has been placed under house arrest.

True, the Afghan Taliban remains largely untouched. But is it really wise for the military to pick a fight with them, too, when it is already battling militants across the country? Hitherto the Afghan group has generally not targeted Pakistanis, focusing its efforts on Afghanistan. But, if Pakistan tried to dislodge them from their sanctuaries in Balochistan and elsewhere, they would likely retaliate, creating yet more violence and instability.

This, in turn, could undermine Pakistan’s government. Sustained civilian rule is something of a novelty in Pakistan: 2013 saw the country’s first ever democratic transition of power. Sharif’s government has already been weakened by corruption allegations, thanks to revelations of offshore dealings in thePanama Papers, and the military is far more popular than the civilian leadership. If the country descends into chaos, another coup cannot be ruled out.

Instead of heavy-handed tactics, the US could take more limited, realistic steps to pressure Pakistan, as Professor Stephen Tankel explains in a recent paper. For instance, conditions could be applied to the provision of specific weapons, rather than to whole packages of aid. America could also work diplomatically with Pakistan’s close ally, China, which shares the US’s fears of terrorism in the region, too, and has in the past encouraged Islamabad to expel Uighur militants.

Bullying Pakistan could have dire consequences. If the US wishes to stop its support for anti-American militant groups, a subtler approach is called for.