The arguments for softening Brexit become more compelling the longer Britain remains outside the EU. Fish are left to rot because new red tape prevents them from getting to market, queues of lorries lengthen at British ports, 40,000 jobs have been lost from our most lucrative sector, and experts warn of possible risks to national security. Even the staunchest Brexiteers struggle to argue that leaving the EU has been of net benefit to the UK.
No wonder that Keir Starmer sees resetting the relationship with the EU as a crucial priority for his government in this parliament. But what the prime minister calls a reset—to date little more than attending summits and agreeing some vague areas of mutual interest—upsets the most passionate of Europhiles. For these people, the only way to undo the damage Brexit wrought on Britain is to rejoin EU institutions and ultimately return to the bloc. And Starmer’s tinkering around the edges goes nowhere near far or fast enough.
In fact, the only way Britain will get anywhere near rejoining the EU—or any of its institutions—will be through a slow, methodical process across a decade or more. This is my view, and it is also the view of the vast majority of officials, experts and lobbyists I’ve interviewed, many of whom want to see Britain back at the heart of European politics. They realise that the politics of Rejoin is incredibly fragile. Moving too fast could kibosh any progress the government makes with Brussels.
Yes, the “slow and steady” approach prolongs Britain’s decline outside the EU, as the harms of Brexit continue. And it’s true that the public wasn’t entirely consulted on the version of Brexit we have; Leave won by 52 per cent of the vote share in 2016 and the Conservatives won a general election in 2019, but neither of those votes addressed all of the issues that would arise from Brexit. At most, they implied permission to trigger Article 50 and implement the Withdrawal Agreement. Most importantly, rejoiners often say, no one voted to leave the Single Market or Customs Union—the act that has done the most obvious economic damage to Britain since Brexit.
None of this hands Starmer a pass to undo Brexit without the public’s consent, even if that could be in the national interest. When we triggered Article 50, leaving the Single Market and Customs Union was the default position. There is no equivalent default position for undoing the most damaging aspects of Brexit. Unfortunately, kicking over a bin is quicker and easier than cleaning up the mess.
If Europhiles want to make any progress over the course of this parliament, they must accept this reality—and understand that it exists for three key reasons: process, politics and timing.
Process
Anyone who has dealt with the EU in a professional capacity will know it involves a lot of process. This would be the case with any meaningful Brexit reset, as significant changes in the current relationship—as outlined in a binding treaty—would almost certainly require the approval of all EU27 member states, the European Parliament and potentially more stakeholders.
I’ve had multiple arguments about whether Britain could simply rejoin the EU single market—but this happens to be a good example of exactly how difficult the Brexit reset really is.
The logic goes: Britain has realised Brexit was a mistake. Polls repeatedly say we regret leaving the EU. To mitigate any further damage, we should apply to join the Single Market as soon as feasibly possible. The snag here is that third countries cannot simply join the single market. To rejoin, Britain would need to join something called the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a group currently of four non-EU members: Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Three of these countries are fully signed up members of the European Economic Area (EEA), through which they are in the Single Market. Switzerland is not in the EEA, but participates in it through bilateral deals. Britain could pursue a Swiss model, but most experts and officials agree that joining the EEA would be quicker and less painful.
To join the EEA, Britain would need the approval of Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland first, then the approval of the EU27. It would have to swallow all of the single market’s rules—including freedom of movement—and accept the jurisdiction of the EFTA court, which doesn’t differentiate a great deal from the hated European Court of Justice, in the sense that it also presides over a common set of rules between trading partners.
Politics
British politicians have talked a lot about freedom of movement and “foreign courts” in the past few years. These are politically contentious topics. They are also conveniently not mentioned in a lot of the polls that are cited as evidence Britain now hates Brexit.
Leaving the EU meant leaving behind the ECJ, which Brexiteers so hated. Any EU rules that still applied to Britain were either negotiated into treaties or voluntarily copied into domestic law.
Britain cannot, however, voluntarily rejoin the institutions and reapply EU rules on freedom of movement without negotiating and agreeing with partners. Imagine Labour beginning negotiations to do that—and to rejoin the EEA—without the explicit consent of the public. Brexiteers would cry foul. They already do—even when nothing is actually happening. It would be a political gift to Reform and the right-wing of the Conservative party.
Timing
The process and politics of the Brexit reset is what dictates its pace. The accession process to join the EU takes around 10 years—and that’s for countries that actively want to join the bloc and accept all its rules. Britain, a country that has already caused enough chaos in Brussels, would be negotiating something arguably even more complicated with partners who are sick of the sight of us.
The anti-Brexit cause is unlikely to get a better prime minister than Starmer in the next decade. But he needs to take his time. If the process of a Brexit reset takes longer than five years, then Starmer will need more than one parliament. If he starts rushing back to Brussels in this parliament, he risks losing the next election—which would set the Remain cause back to square one. The louder Europhiles shout at him to get a move on, the easier it is for the likes of Nigel Farage, Kemi Badenoch and Robert Jenrick to paint him as a closet Remainer.
It might not be fair, but the truth is that Brexiteers had the luxury of shattering a vase and walking away. Rejoiners must sweep up those parts and carefully stick them back together. It doesn’t take a genius to understand why that won’t be a quick job.
