Many global jihadis talk about restoring the Islamic (read: Sunni) caliphate, but little has been done to pick a caliph—until recently. In October the world was introduced to the candidate as the head of the "Islamic state of Iraq"—otherwise known as the Sunni triangle. Then a month later, the new chief of "al Qaeda in Mesopotamia," Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (called Abu Ayyub al-Masri by US intelligence) declared his allegiance to the newly founded "state" and its leader.
We have no photo of the new champion, nor a real name: just a voice and an alleged pedigree. The would-be caliph's pseudonym is Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and in public announcements he or his spin doctors are pushing his descent from Muhammad's tribe of Quraysh. The name is significant: "Omar" is provocatively Sunni, referring to the second caliph after the Prophet, and "al-Baghdadi" sends the signal that the time has come to relocate the caliphate to the place of its most glorious epoch: Iraq.
On 22nd December, an audio tape containing al-Baghdadi's inaugural speech was released on jihadi websites, including several linked to al Qaeda, introducing al-Baghdadi as Prince of the Faithful—a title historically the exclusive prerogative of caliphs. Al Qaeda had previously addressed the Taliban's chief, Mullah Omar, by that title, but never with any caliphal connotation. With al-Baghdadi, however, coupling the claim of Qurayshite lineage—a requisite for caliphs—with the title heralds a wholly different interpretation. Al-Baghdadi is clearly being groomed by al Qaeda as the temporal leader of the Muslim world.
Osama bin Laden, not a Qurayshi, must console himself with the title of Sheikh of the Mujahedin, bestowed upon him by al-Baghdadi. Whereas jihadists of the Bin Laden generation and before had been avoiding choosing a caliph so as not to highlight tensions within the movement, the present generation of jihadists in Iraq—an avant-garde of sorts for the global movement—is forcing the issue of selecting a caliph, a proper Qurayshite this time, come what may. History tells us this much: there will be dissent over this nomination, and bloodshed in its wake. With Saddam gone, Iraq's Sunnis are desperately seeking to fill a leadership vacuum, which may explain al-Baghdadi's hurry.
Iraqi jailbreaks
And what explains the Iraqi government's hurry to hang Saddam? It may have had something to do with recent prison breaks by senior Sunni Arabs. However unlikely a Saddam breakout might have seemed in London, to many Iraqis it was a live possibility.
Ayham al-Samarrai, a Sunni Iraqi-American who lived in Chicago for over 25 years, was being detained by Iraq's public integrity commission—the government's anti-corruption arm—for embezzling up to "hundreds of millions of dollars" during his 22-month tenure as minister of electricity. When first charged, al-Samarrai was whisked from the courtroom by American security contractors. It was the first of his prison breaks. (He was later handed back to Iraqi authorities.) That first charge was thrown out on appeal for lack of evidence, but al-Samarrai continued to be held in a deluxe prison "cell"—he had internet and phone access—to answer two new charges being readied for prosecution. But he vanished from prison in December and emerged in neighbouring Jordan to boast to an American reporter of a "Chicago-style" prison break. Al-Samarrai has since maintained that he is a victim of Shia malice.
His escape, coupled with the jailbreak in December by a nephew of Saddam's in Mosul, contributed to the fear many Iraqis felt that Saddam's regime cannot really be over. "What if the Americans allow Saddam to escape as part of a deal with Sunni insurgents?" was a question one often heard in Baghdad in 2006.
These fears may have influenced Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's promptness in signing Saddam's death warrant, four days after the final appeal. Maliki recently complained to President Bush that the Americans in Iraq—namely Washington's outgoing ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, a Sunni Afghan—were drifting towards a pro-Sunni stance aiming to achieve "Baath-lite" order, based on secret negotiations with Baathists and Sunni jihadists, including the Islamic Army of Iraq.
Another Baathist turns to jihad
Khalilzad's alleged drive to bring the Sunnis on board has been disgraced in Iraqi eyes by his failure to secure any let-up in the Sunni insurgency. No more poignant example can be found than Mishan al-Jabouri, a Sunni MP who in October was stripped of parliamentary immunity to face charges from the public integrity commission for embezzlement and funding terrorists. (He was first detained at Baghdad airport in May 2005 while trying to board a flight with $400,000 in cash.)
Al-Jabouri, now hiding in Damascus, had been awarded contracts by the Americans to protect oil pipes around Baghdad (which, mysteriously, went on getting blown up) while US officials hyped him to journalists as an insurgent conduit who could be reasoned with. Al-Jabouri had been a Baath insider until he fell out with Uday Hussein in the mid-1990s and escaped to Syria—where he reinvented himself as a dissident.
The former US favourite has now set up a satellite television station, Al-Zawraa, which is seen as an al Qaeda organ so frequently does al-Jabouri air jihadi propaganda such as that produced by al-Baghdadi's outfit.
You can read Nibras Kazimi's blog at http://talismangate.blogspot.com
