One of the many casualties of the war in Ukraine is Angela Merkel’s legacy. She left office a much respected, albeit not loved, figure. She is now seen as the architect of Germany’s security policy woes.
During her 16 years in office, she neglected the Bundeswehr to the point where—according to the head of the German army—it is incapable of serious military action. She allowed herself to be panicked by Fukushima into prematurely closing Germany’s nuclear power plants without any plan for how the lost electricity supplies would be replaced. More fatally, as things turned out, she increased Germany’s dependence on Russian gas. Though the contract for the first Nord Stream pipeline had already been signed before she entered office, it was Merkel who approved the construction of Nord Stream 2, a decision she took after Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
As a result, Germany was poorly placed to deal with the consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Initially the government hunkered down in the traditional German policy bunker: arms supplies to Ukraine, other than 5,000 helmets, were ruled out on the spurious grounds that Germany did not supply lethal weapons to conflict zones (even RAF supply flights were routed around German airspace because of uncertainty about whether they would be allowed); only minimal sanctions were to be considered; Nord Stream 2 was not to be affected; and the emphasis, as always, was on political dialogue. The new(ish) chancellor, Olaf Scholz, was criticised in the German media for his inability to communicate or offer any sort of lead. He seemed paralysed by events and virtually disappeared from public view. For a time, it seemed that his foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock from the Green Party, was making all the running.
But on 27th February all this changed. In a highly unusual Sunday session of the Bundestag, Scholz made a speech in which he described the Russian invasion as a “Zeitenwende,” a watershed moment, which “marked a change in the history of our continent.” He reversed Germany’s security policy of the last 30 years. Nord Stream 2 would not enter service; tough economic sanctions were placed on Russia, including a commitment to eliminate dependency on its energy supplies; anti-tank weapons were delivered to Ukraine; and an additional €100bn was added to Germany’s defence budget, with a view to immediately meeting the Nato 2 per cent target.
The reaction to Scholz’s announcement in Germany was one of both surprise and relief. Friedrich Merz, the CDU opposition leader, came out firmly in support. Wolfgang Schäuble, the elder statesman of German politics, acknowledged that previous governments had got things wrong in dealing with Russia. Only Frank-Walter Steinmeier, now president of Germany and a former foreign minister and chief of staff to the now discredited ex-chancellor Gerhard Schröder, misjudged the new mood. He organised a peace concert featuring Russian musicians which the Ukrainian ambassador contemptuously boycotted.
Full implementation of the new policies will take time. The economics minister, Robert Habeck from the Green party, has said that though Russian supplies of oil and coal to Germany will end this year, gas will have to be imported until 2024. But almost all major German companies have now pulled out of Russia and the economic impact of the boycott there is already being felt.
There will always in Germany be a penchant for peace, a feeling that diplomacy must be given a chance. Scholz will continue to support President Macron’s self-mandated efforts to broker an early deal. If one does emerge, then German industry will soon demand a relaxation of sanctions. But there is unlikely to be a reversion to the naive policies of the past. For Germany’s strategic culture this does indeed look like a watershed moment.
It will have implications for Germany’s partners. For a couple of years, much of the new defence funding will have to be spent on refurbishing the Bundeswehr’s existing equipment and improving its supplies and logistics. But over time, the sheer size of Germany’s economy will mean that its armed forces will be the most powerful in Europe. For those countries, like Britain, which have long urged Germany to meet the Nato target, this may take some getting used to.
