After independence

Kosovo's declaration of independence merely formalises the status quo. Europe's newest country faces serious social and economic challenges
February 29, 2008

The Kosovan government has finally made good on its intention to unilaterally declare independence from Serbia. As expected, the US and most EU countries will recognise it. The declaration follows the months of stalemate that set in last March after the UN's special envoy, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, came up with a plan for Kosovo's conditional independence—a proposal that the Kosovo Albanians had accepted, but which was rejected by the Serb government. Neither party departed from their original position, which made a consensual, negotiated solution all but impossible. (The territory's independence is conditional and limited, with significant governmental powers such as the police and judiciary still under international authority.)

The months of talks and waiting, however, have helped the EU to overcome many of its internal divisions on the future of Kosovo. Partly in response to Russian attempts to use the issue of Kosovo to divide EU members, a consensus on conditional independence as the least worst option for Kosovo has developed among most member states. (Resistance has come from states that fear that recognising Kosovo could encourage separatism in their own countries, such as Cyprus, Romania, and Spain.) It also meant that the EU had sufficient time to plan for its engagement in Kosovo: the Eulex mission of nearly 2,000 police and judicial personnel to support the development of the rule of law and ensure the protection of minorities.

Over the past year, Kosovans and the international community have focused their attention on the question of the province's political status. Independence alone, however, will not solve the three key challenges to security and development that Kosovo faces: the fraught relationship between the Serb minority and the Albanian majority; the dire economic situation; and the increasing disillusionment of Kosovo's youth.

Since the mob violence against minorities in March 2004, Kosovo's Serbs have almost completely disengaged from the territory's political institutions. Following calls from Belgrade, Serbs boycotted the elections in 2004 and in 2007, and have been strongly discouraged from participating in any of the territory's government institutions other than at local level. The few Kosovo Serb politicians who have joined the new government and who have spoken about the necessity of accommodation have been condemned and ostracised. Unsurprisingly, Serb MPs boycotted the parliament's vote on independence. While Kosovo Serbs attended the status discussions alongside the Belgrade delegation, they had no independent voice as the Serbian government effectively monopolised the presentation of the Serb position. With around two thirds of the roughly 130,000 Kosovo Serbs living in mostly small rural communities among the Albanian majority, any partition of the territory would have devastating humanitarian consequences. This leaves Kosovan Serbs marginalised and vulnerable not only to attacks from Albanian extremists, but also to manipulation by the Belgrade government. The international community needs to encourage Serbs to participate in the political institutions at all levels, and ensure that they remain represented in the security services, especially the police, to build confidence among the Serb minority that the new independent state does not pose a physical threat to them.

The attention devoted to Kosovo's status has also crowded out public debate about an issue that both Serbs and Albanians consistently rank as a major concern: the dire state of Kosovo's economy. While Kosovo's economy grew between 3 and 4 per cent a year in 2006 and 2007 despite declining donor support, only around 150,000 people out of an estimated population of 2m have registered and taxed employment, and half of these work for the government. Even if informal employment in subsistence agriculture and the grey economy of small traders and day labourers are included, probably not more than 350,000 people have some form of employment—less than 20 per cent of the population. While independence might encourage investment—it will reduce the existing uncertainty about property rights and will allow Kosovo access to sovereign lending—it will do little to address the structural problems of poor infrastructure (the daily power cuts will continue) and inefficient subsistence agriculture. Almost two thirds of Kosovo's population live in rural areas, yet despite eight years of international governance and extensive donor involvement, agriculture has remained largely unreformed. Poverty is increasingly rural, with 70 per cent of the poor living in the countryside. Yet, of the €1.1bn aid pledged by the European Agency for Reconstruction in Kosovo from 1999 to 2006, only €68m was spent on agriculture.

Kosovo needs a long-term rural development strategy with extensive technical and financial assistance to increase productivity, and the encouragement of alternative rural employment. These are normally part of the EU accession process, which worked well in Bulgaria and Romania, countries with similar structural problems to Kosovo. Independence for Kosovo therefore needs to be followed by a clear perspective for EU membership to provide the incentive for further reform, and the technical and financial support to achieve it.

Kosovo is not only one of the poorest parts of Europe, it is also one of the youngest—half the population is under 25. This is a rural backwater with the population density of south England. The education system is poor and corrupt, leaving most school and university students uncertain about their future, with bleak prospects for employment. Kosovo's youth are disillusioned and increasingly desperate; a recent UNDP report found that almost half of Kosovars between 15 and 24 would emigrate if they could. However, strict visa regimes make legal migration almost impossible. The Schengen regime applied by most EU member states makes school or university exchanges or trips to Europe prohibitively difficult. An entire generation of young Kosovars has been excluded from experiencing Europe, while at the same time is expected to push for the "Europeanisation" of their home.

The presence of a large number of disillusioned, unemployed, impoverished young males raises the prospect of further outbreaks of violence—primarily against minorities but also, if the aggressive stance of the Vetëvendosje (self-determination) student movement against Kosovo's established politicians is an indicator, between the generations. Furthermore, many of them are likely to try to get to western Europe clandestinely if they cannot enter legally, joining the estimated 550,000 Kosovo Albanians already in EU countries. To defuse this source of instability, European countries need to make it easier for Kosovars to live and work in Europe. This could have the added benefit of increased remittance payments back to Kosovo.

Renewed violence and ethnic cleansing is by no means a foregone conclusion in Kosovo, but neither is a self-sustaining peace. Recognition of Kosovo's independence merely formalises the status quo; it does not provide a road map towards stability and prosperity. In particular, an impoverished Kosovo that neighbours a divided Serbia that is turning away from Europe is a recipe for instability. European states need to find the political will to make Kosovo part of Europe. Otherwise they will have to live with the consequences of their indecision, and address the humanitarian and possibly military costs of renewed conflict.