An imperfect answer to the Syrian crisis

One sure sign of a crisis is that the ground shifts so often that one starts to feel seasick. That is certainly a good description of the situation in Syria. In the past 24 hours everything has changed. The make-or-break Congress vote was cancelled, military action indefinitely postponed—perhaps forever.

What caused such a turnaround? Believe it or not, the Russians may have found a solution which everyone can almost agree on; for the Assad regime to give up its chemical weapons to international control. They would be secured by UN inspectors and then destroyed. This, on the face of it, is a simple, effective solution, which would prevent any further war crimes. It also gives the US and Russia a reason to unfreeze their relationship, which could be the key to finding long-term peace.

How this came about is a marvel of slip-ups and coincidences. In a speech earlier this week the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, made a flippant remark during an interview in which he indicated that US military strikes against Assad's arms capabilities could be halted if he gave up his chemical weapons. The Russian Foreign Ministry promptly seized on this as a way to protect their ally and, accordingly, their strategic influence in the Middle East, where their control over Syria and Iran acts as a counter to American dominance. Within hours the Russians had drafted a resolution that would see the weapons secured and destroyed. Scared by the prospect of American firepower landing on its doorstep, the Syrian regime readily endorsed the plan—they had spotted a very convenient way out.

This is not the panacea it seems; there are two very big flaws in Russia's scheme. Firstly, it is a logistical minefield. The only organisation which could conceivably take on the task of securing the weapons is the UN. But there is no precedent here: this is not a job for traditional peacemaking troops, yet it is unheard of for the UN to put large numbers of weapons inspectors on the grounds in the middle of a conflict. There isn't anyone to do the job. In addition, it could be impossible to safely extract the weapons, which creates the possibility of UN personnel (whoever they are) being stranded in a dangerous situation for quite some time. The spectre of the never-ending Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts again rear their heads; the world is weary of missions which do not come stamped with end dates. Most worryingly, the UN would have to rely on Assad to tell them where the weapons were. As I'm sure is fairly obvious to everyone, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that he should lie—only disclosing the location of some of his stockpile while keeping back enough to continue to wreak carnage.

Secondly, removing the chemical weapons does nothing to stop the bloodshed. Chemical attacks have killed just over 1000 people, yet 100,000 have died in the past two years. Chemical weapons— although horrendous—are just a tip of the enormous iceberg that is a civil and religious war. Confiscating the chemicals is a weak move and simply says that the outside world only cares about those 1000-odd deaths. The notion of confiscation conjures images of a teacher taking a naughty teenager's mobile phone; it hardly seems like a punishment which reflects the enormity of gassing one's own people. In short, it creates a moral hazard situation; having got away with this, what else will Assad feel empowered to do? That is not a question I wish to see answered.