World

Sisi must share the blame for unrest in Sinai

Growing unrest in the province can't be blamed on former President Mohamed Morsi alone

November 06, 2015
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One of the motives of what is now believed to be the bombing of a Russian passenger plane over the Sinai Peninsula on October 31 may have been to sour, or scupper altogether, the visit to Britain of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi just days later. Instead, however, it may have given him an opportunity to further convince Prime Minister David Cameron of the need to support him and his heavy-handed, security-focused style of governance.

In so doing, both leaders may attempt to deflect attention away from protests and heavy criticisms surrounding the visit, particularly regarding Britain's business-as-usual approach to a government that Human Rights Watch accused on Wednesday of being responsible for Egypt's "worst human rights crisis in decades."

The UK has a direct interest in stability in a country that is a key ally and trading partner in the Middle East, and a favourite destination for British tourists. However, it would be a mistake for Cameron to endorse or turn a blind eye to policies that, while portrayed by Cairo as necessary counter-terrorism measures, have only inflamed militancy, particularly in the Sinai.

The overthrow of Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, in 2013 led to the intensification of an insurgency in the Sinai to which Sisi's responses have only contributed. Sweeping military measures in the peninsula—including a draconian crackdown on dissent, a media blackout, and a ban on reports that contradict the official line—have alienated the local population.

Arguably the biggest cause of resentment at present is the forced evacuation of thousands of civilians—including the destruction of the entire city of Rafah—that began last year to establish a buffer zone along Sinai's border with the Gaza Strip. Amnesty International has described the scale of the evictions as "astonishing."

Cairo has justified this by making baseless, self-serving claims that the Sinai insurgency is being fuelled by weapons and fighters from Gaza, which is already under a strict blockade by Egypt and Israel. Cairo's further tightening of the blockade has not only failed to quell the Sinai insurgency, but has hurt its residents' long-running economic and social links to the Palestinian territory.

A major misconception of Sinai militancy is that it began after Morsi's removal. In fact, it was a major problem during his predecessor Hosni Mubarak's decades-long rule. This has been the case since his ousting in 2011, which increased lawlessness in the peninsula.

This misconception suits the current government because it can blame supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood for contributing to the militancy (despite the Brotherhood's denials). It also suits those opposed to Morsi's removal because they can blame his successors for the worsening security situation, and for creating a problem that supposedly did not previously exist.

The truth is that all of Egypt's leaders, from Mubarak onwards, have contributed to Sinai's deterioration by viewing it primarily as a security issue, and thus responding with force. The motives of the unrest have been dangerously over-simplified and misunderstood.

Sinai residents' grievances are deep-rooted. They include demands for greater autonomy, the selling and resettlement of their land under Mubarak, and economic, political and social marginalisation.

As long as the violence and lawlessness in Sinai are seen purely as a result of radical religious militancy, rather than of long-standing grievances against the state, the situation will continue to fester. This will benefit militant groups in the peninsula, who have managed to feed off local resentment—citing issues such as the state's killing and displacement of civilians—to increase their ranks, justify their attacks and garner sympathy.

The most active of these groups—Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, or Sinai Province—pledged allegiance last year to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Russian plane.

Just as Britain has a direct interest in stability in Egypt, including the Sinai, it also has a direct interest in properly understanding the insurgency's various root causes and contributing factors, rather than just focusing on its effects. Such an understanding will not come from blindly embracing a president whose policies have greatly aggravated and conveniently over-simplified the problem.