Power's world: undermining Afghanistan's opium business

Here's a paradox for you. The Obama administration is, quite rightly, gearing up to pressure the Europeans to put more men in boots on the ground in Afghanistan. And the Europeans, quite rightly, don't want to engage in a war of attrition à la Russia in Afghanistan in the 1980s or the US in Vietnam before that. There is nothing worse than having to pull out with your tail between your legs and confront the electorate for thousands of needless deaths among your brave young. Who is right—and what should be done?

The answer is that the Europeans, using their nous as well as their soldiers, should confront the issue of the Afghanistan poppy crop: a crop that is responsible for 90 per cent of the heroin sold in Europe, and that funds over 80 per cent of Taliban activity.

And this brings me to a memorable conversation I had in Islamabad with President/General Pervez Musharraf two years ago (and that was published in Prospect in March 2007). He suggested that the west should introduce a common agricultural policy for Afghan's poppies—in other words, it should do as both the EU and the US do with certain agricultural crops—and should buy it up with government money. ”Buying the crop is an idea one could explore”, he told me, in answer to what I had a bit nervously thought was a provocative question, ”Pakistan doesn't have the money for it. We would need help from the US or the UN. But we could buy up the whole crop and destroy it. In that way the poor growers would not suffer.”

Buying the Afghan poppy crop was first suggested by the International Council on Security and Development. The idea would solve two problems in one blow. First, it would prevent the opium farmers from being driven into the arms of the Taliban, as they currently (and often unwillingly) are. Second, this crop could help the world, and especially the poorer parts in Asia and Africa, given thee chronic global shortage of medical opiates. Millions die each work in excruciating pain for want of such relief. Death is bad enough, but to die in extreme agony is the most frightening thing a human being can face. Yet India, Australia and Turkey—the latter encouraged by the Americans since 1974—are the only countries allowed to grow poppies under the supervisory authority of the World Health Organisation. Western countries then buy most of this crop.

Needless to say, there are the many practical problems that appear to confront this idea. If the price were set too high, it might encourage even more farmers to grow opium poppies. Besides, however high the price, it is said by some UN agricultural economists that the traffickers would simply outbid the government, safe in the knowledge that a majority of recipients—the addicts—would foot the bill. And if the price were not high enough, the farmers would go on selling at least some of the crop on the black market. Even if a premium did have to be paid it would still be cheaper than the cost of new troops and an escalation of the war.

But this overlooks human nature, especially in an earnest Islamic nation where everyone—including the once anti-drug Taliban—knows that narcotics are strongly condemned by traditional Islamic teaching. Only desperation has driven most farmers to opium. All things considered, they would rather sell to a government agency at, say, today's going price; especially when they know that their product is going to help people in pain.

Sartaj Aziz, a renowned agricultural expert and also a former agriculture and finance minister of Pakistan, wrote to Prospect in response to my interview to say that he liked the idea and that it should be tried out on an experimental basis in one of Afghanistan's poppy areas. Equally, I rehearsed many of these issues with Musharraf and his response was "Look, let's analyse it, let's cost it and see if it is practical.” Now, according to an article by Bernd Debusmann, a forthcoming paper by Professor James Nathan—a former State Department official—says the total cost of such a program might be $2.5bn each year; not that much when compared with the $200bn that the US has already spent on the war (and that figure doesn't count NATO's contribution).

Such a policy would be far more effective in undermining both the Taliban and al Qaeda than any number of new troops sent in for combat. But let some of the troops arrive to help with the buying up of the crop, to make sure there are no secret, unofficial, diversions and to police the districts declared as in compliance.

President Barack Obama has called for new ideas on the world's seeming intractable problems. Well here's one.