World

Betting the House (of Saud): Mohammed bin Salman is a dangerous pick for Saudi Arabian crown prince

He is now next in line to the throne, but over the past couple of years has gained a reputation as a high-stakes risk-taker. What would his reign look like?

June 22, 2017
Photo: Rainer Jensen/DPA/PA Images
Photo: Rainer Jensen/DPA/PA Images

Until two and a half years ago, few Middle East watchers knew Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud’s name. Now, after the latest in a series of strokes of his father’s pen, he looks almost certain to be the next king of Saudi Arabia—perhaps within weeks or months—and to play a major role, for better or for worse, in shaping the future of the Middle East.

Bin Salman may be a relative newcomer, but it is already clear what his reign might look like. The 31-year-old’s elevation to crown prince, making him first in line to the Saudi throne, is just the latest in a series of moves designed to concentrate power in the kingdom, historically spread out across the ruling Al Saud family, around a single individual in a manner not seen since the internal schisms that followed the death of the founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud.

Since his father became king in January 2015, bin Salman has been named defense minister and the head of new national bodies overseeing security and economic affairs. He has seized control of management of the kingdom’s relationship with the US, and has taken a growing role in the management of the Saudi oil sector, earning himself the monicker of Saudi Arabia’s “minister of everything.” He has also quickly established a reputation as a high-stakes risk-taker.

Mohammed bin Salman, or “MbS” as he is known, charted an aggressive foreign policy course abroad from the get-go, most notably becoming the public face of a campaign in neighboring Yemen. It was the first time in decades the kingdom had taken the lead in a military venture overseas, and quickly became mired in controversy, not least over accusations that a Saudi-led aerial bombing campaign was indiscriminately killing civilians. More recently, bin Salman played a key role in the isolation of neighboring Qatar. He also initiated what for Saudi Arabia are radical economic reforms, clustered around the “Vision 2030” plan he unveiled in 2016 and is expected to lead an IPO of Aramco, the state oil firm and Saudi Arabia’s golden goose, in 2018.

Critics argue that bin Salman is betting the house (of Saud) on a series of high-stakes gambles aimed at fundamentally changing the way the kingdom is perceived at home and overseas—and shoring up local and international support for his reign—but for which there is no guarantee of success. Diplomats and even some Saudi officials quietly advocated for the idea that Mohammed bin Nayef, his cousin, the kingdom’s longtime interior minister and until 21st June its crown prince, would as King act as a moderating force with his sometimes brash cousin. And now, sacked by Salman to make way for the king’s son, he is out of the picture.

Yet if Saudi royals, who ordinarily loathe radical change (the Kingdom’s informal slogan has long been the paradoxical “progress without change”) are worried, they aren't showing it publicly. Before the reshuffle in succession, Saudi Arabia’s so-called “allegiance council” voted MbS in, with 31 votes for, three against. That puts bin Salman in a strong position domestically. Add in his purportedly strong relationship with members of Donald Trump’s administration and he would appear to be sitting pretty.

Bin Salman’s purported ambitions include a complete overhaul of the Saudi economy, a redefinition of the social contract possibly in defiance of the country’s powerful religious establishment, and a new, Saudi-led order for the Middle East (and by logical extension the defeat of the kingdom’s great rival Iran in various proxy conflicts across the region).

Yet much can go wrong in foreign affairs, and it is worth noting that most of bin Salman’s attempts to project Saudi power to date have largely gone awry. In March of 2015, he launched a military campaign in Yemen, aimed at pushing the purportedly Iran-backed Houthis out of the capital. People around bin Salman predicted the war would last a few weeks. It has now been underway for more than two years and shows no sign of abating.

In 2016 Saudi officials, under instructions from bin Salman, led attempts to form a Syrian “High Negotiations Committee” to take part in peace talks on Syria. But little progress has been made since. More recently Riyadh has become embroiled in attempts to bully neighboring Qatar into abandoning a two decade old foreign policy stance. Instead of backing down, Qatar has stood firm, and US officials now question the wisdom of the campaign orchestrated against Doha, which has seen Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut off their land, sea and air borders to Qatari citizens and businesses, given the lack of evidence that the Saudis and others have been able to produce on the Qataris’ alleged misdeeds.

With the internal competition for power now over in Saudi Arabia, analysts now believe that bin Salman will next turn his attention to projecting Saudi power across the region, possibly by deepening their involvement in conflicts across the region, with Syria likely to be at the top of the list of priorities.

Bin Salman clearly has big ambitions. But he may be on shakier ground than many believe, given his track record. Once an anonymous figure, he is likely to be remembered no matter what, but the question is what for.

 

 

Now read David Wearing on why Britain should revisit its relationship with Saudi Arabia