William Hague’s voice was a handicap when he was leader of the Conservative Party; it was his greatest asset as Foreign Secretary. Flat, gravelly, but warm, particularly on the causes he made his own, it was instantly recognisable, on radio or across the kind of international conference hall where personality is mangled by simultaneous translation. He has been one of Britain’s most outspoken foreign secretaries, and in that, one of the most valuable.
His decision to stand down at the next election, despite being one of the party’s most recognisable figures, was a surprise to many. That he considered the role the last one he wanted in mainstream politics was not; stories have been flying for weeks of his emphatic refusal to take on the UK post somewhere within the European Commission, at what is a low point in UK-EU relations.
His biggest frustration in the job surely came with parliament’s vote against UK intervention in Syria, a position he did not support, and David Cameron’s mishandling of the politics of that vote. After that, he was clearly undermined by having strong views that ran against government policy. The post itself, however, has become more intrinsically limited, and hence frustrating, over the past couple of decades. Prime Ministers tend to do much of the negotiating with their counterparts in the EU, as David Cameron has done; even if the Prime Minister mishandles key relationships badly—as David Cameron has done, with Germany—there is little that the Foreign Secretary can do about it.
And the power of the job has shrunk further with Britain’s setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the cuts to the military that have followed. Philip Hammond, Hague’s successor in King Charles Street, who was until the reshuffle Defence Secretary in charge of cuts, will at least not find that aspect of the job a surprise.
Hague’s predecessors found those constraints closing in on them. Jack Straw got the best of the recent past during his tenure (2001-2006), before the military cuts, before the Iraq debacle fully hit Tony Blair’s reputation, and while there seemed progress in the talks with Iran over the disputed nuclear programme. He suffered gibes though that he—and Britain—were merely the stooges of the Americans. “There he is, taking orders from Condi [Condoleezza Rice] again,” said one of his officials sardonically, watching him pacing the lawns of the French Ambassador’s residence high above Geneva, at one stage of the Iran talks. Margaret Beckett (2006-07) tried to talk about energy and climate change but never quite found her feet; David Miliband (2007-2010) travelled a lot, urging the merits of democracy and the EU on those—such as Turkey at that point, and Romania—who were already converted, while offending his ambassadors by accusing them of being too white, middle aged and male. Miliband did recognise, though, that the case for democracy needed making anew, and did much make Britain a vocal part of that.
Hague has done better than any of these, however. When he took on the job in 2010, he set out the principles he would pursue in four linked speeches (rather a grandiose notion, hard on his audiences—someone should have stopped him). But while over ambitious in concept, the speeches were excellent—setting out Britain’s commitment to law and to liberal values. He picked up the script that Miliband had drafted and gave it real force, with an underpinning that stretched back through Britain’s history into the roots of law, and oratorical skills that his predecessors had lacked.
He developed this over the following months—and years—into an assured commentary that made it clear that Britain’s support could not be assumed, and that Britain would pick its friends and its causes from those that shared the country’s fundamental values. At a time when immigration, the rise of UKIP, austerity and rapid military downsizing were shaking the country’s sense of its role in the world, this was an unapologetic argument (which never resorted to the coy phrase “punching above its weight”) that Britain still stood for something.
He was particularly outspoken on a couple of issues. On the Middle East, he was forthright in warning of the dangers if the Syrian civil war were left to burn. He took himself into the front line of international engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian deadlock, telling the Israeli government bluntly that it was wrong to keep expanding settlements on the West Bank; he led the UK into a much more assertive position on this front against Israel.
In the last two years, he chose to devote considerable time to campaigning—there is no other word for it—with Angelina Jolie, the film actress, against rape and other sexual violence in war. Some discerned in this the decision of a politician nearing the end of the time he wanted to spend in office to say exactly what he thought, on subjects that he most cared about. He has made clear that he will continue talking and writing on this after leaving office. Others saw something similar—the strong flavour of the endgame—in his high profile trip to India last week with George Osborne; most foreign secretaries would not readily share the limelight with the Chancellor like that.
What difference will Hammond make? Possibly, from immersion in the subject, he might bring more focus to the aggrieved business of extracting Britain from Afghanistan. He is certainly familiar with the map of the world’s troublespots, and up to date with the intelligence briefings. But it all hangs on Europe. As ever, this will fall to the Prime Minister more than the Foreign Secretary. But Hammond’s more eurosceptic instincts could tilt the tone of the relations half a notch further into cool. At a troubled point in the EU, and with, many think, another crisis of bank stability in the eurozone brewing, this could have a marked impact on Britain’s relations with Brussels, and ultimately how it approaches the question of an exit.
