The Irish border issue must be kept in perspective

The border should be a relatively small issue as far as Brexit is concerned. That it has taken on such prominence is a triumph of Irish diplomatic manoeuvring

by Graham Gudgin / February 5, 2018 / Leave a comment

An abandoned Customs Facilitation Office at the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Photo: PA

As we enter the UK’s last full year as a member of the EU, negotiations are about to begin to determine the long-term relationship with the EU27. The Progress Report of December 8^th 2017 recorded agreement on UK ‘divorce’ payments, the rights of EU citizens and arrangements for the land border between the UK and Ireland. The Cambridge Law Professor Simon Deakin takes the view that “while this is merely a joint report on progress in phase one of the Brexit negotiations …. Its contents are likely to be incorporated into the withdrawal agreement envisaged by article 50.”

Some UK Ministers have suggested that its contents can be amended and point to the Report’s opening statement that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” In addition, paragraph 46 of the Irish border section of the Progress Report states that “the commitments and principles outlined in this joint report will not pre-determine the outcome of wider discussions on the future relationship between the EU and the UK and are, as necessary, specific to the unique circumstances on the Island of Ireland.”

All is thus to play for—but Deakin’s interpretation is likely to dominate EU thinking, and unless the UK is prepared for ‘no deal’ on trade, it will dominate.

Any non-negotiability of the Progress Report’s contents will present a real problem that will come to haunt the stage two negotiations. Specifically, big problems are likely to arise over what should be a small issue: the Irish land border.

A triumph of Irish diplomatic manoeuvring

The prominence of the Irish border in the stage one negotiations and in the Progress Report (where it occupies 14 out of 96 paragraphs) was a triumph of Irish diplomatic manoeuvring over common sense.

The crux of the problem is the Irish demand, and UK undertaking, to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland. The Report is silent on where or how this commitment was made and focusses instead on how this commitment is to be operationalised. The key paragraph states that “The UK’s intention [is to avoid a hard border] through the overall EU-UK relationship. Should this not be possible the UK will propose specific solutions to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland.”

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Comments

John S.
February 5, 2018 at 12:36
I am afraid there is nothing'shallow' about the 141 different areas of North South daily fully-integrated and interwoven engagement, underpinned by common EU standards that are under threat by a decision taken unilaterally by the British and against the will of the people in the North. Those common EU standards that the British want to break with are the basis that allows strand II of the GFA to effectively function. That is your 'perspective'.The British have signed up to Full Alignment and they will be bound by that or there will be no transition and Britain will face third country status with all that implies for its economy. Such is the price of handing your country over to ideological extremists who think nothing of the consequences of their actions.

Graham Gudgin

Graham Gudgin is Honorary Research Associate at the Centre For Business Research (CBR) in the Judge Business School at the University of Cambridge and Cheief Economic Advisor at Policy exchange in London. He was director of the Northern Ireland Economic Research Centre from 1985 to 1998 when he became Special Adviser to the First Minister in the NI Assembly until 2002.