Salmond has far to leap

The Scottish route to independence is more complicated than the SNP would have you believe
July 25, 2008

Alex Salmond's plan is to hold a referendum on Scottish independence soon after 2010, when the Conservatives have won the general election but with (probably) only five seats in Scotland. The Scottish backlash could propel the vote to independence. The media assume that if the Scots were to vote yes, Scotland would automatically become independent. But this would be only the beginning of the process. There are five stepping stones on the road to independence, any of which could become a roadblock. Salmond needs to negotiate each one successfully before Scotland can go it alone.

The first is that a referendum cannot be held without the approval of the Scottish parliament. At present there are 50 members of the parliament in favour of independence (47 SNP, plus two Scottish Greens, plus the independent Margo Macdonald). Against, there are 79 members of the three unionist parties: Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrats. If these parties vote against a bill, no referendum can be held. But following Wendy Alexander's call in May to "bring it on," it will be more difficult for Labour to oppose the referendum bill. Her outburst suggests that Labour is now willing to knock open the first gate for the SNP.

The second hurdle is the referendum itself. Opinion polls over the last ten years have consistently shown Scottish support for independence remaining at around 25 to 30 per cent. Even if those figures improve with a Tory government in London, what people say in polls and what they do when faced with a ballot paper are two different things. The 2004 referendum on regional government in northeast England provided dramatic evidence of this.

Third, the referendum proposed by the SNP would simply authorise the Scottish government to start negotiations with the British government about the terms of independence. Some of these may be deeply unwelcome. The Scots would no longer receive transfers from the British taxpayer, which currently enable them to enjoy levels of per capita public expenditure some 20 per cent higher than in England. And then there is the EU. Although the position is not certain under international and EU law, the better view is that in the event of Scottish independence, the rest of Britain would be deemed the successor state which would remain in membership, and Scotland would have to reapply.

The SNP disputes this. Its white paper "Choosing Scotland's Future" maintains that an independent Scotland would continue to be a member of the EU, but acknowledges that there would be "negotiations on the detailed terms of membership." Recognising the need for negotiations must include recognising the possibility that those negotiations might fail, so even on the SNP's own terms, renewed membership is not guaranteed. Other member states, like Spain, might block the negotiations for fear of encouraging the independence claims of their own national minorities, in the same way that they signalled their unhappiness at the prospect of independence for Kosovo. There are half a dozen EU states in this position.

Whether Scotland was offered fast track re-entry would depend on how strongly Britain supported Scotland's application. That in turn might depend on the outcome of negotiations on other big issues: North sea oil, division of the national debt, the future of the defence bases on the Clyde. These are just some of the bigger issues. The Czech-Slovak "velvet divorce" in 1992 required 31 treaties and over 2,000 separate agreements. Their equivalents for Scotland and Britain would take a long time to negotiate. Once concluded, they would constitute the terms of independence, on which the people of Scotland would deserve a separate vote.

A second referendum on the terms of independence should be the fourth hurdle to clear before Scotland becomes independent. The SNP contests the need for a second referendum. But the principle of informed consent makes it necessary. Basing democratic authorisation solely on a first referendum, on the initial question of principle, is not sufficient because the information at that stage is not available. It is like buying a house you like the look of without knowing the price or having a survey done. The people of Scotland deserve better than that. The British government is entitled to insist on a second referendum to test whether Scotland wants independence on the terms that have been negotiated.

Westminster legislation is the fifth and last hurdle to be cleared. Independence can be granted only by Westminster; it is not within the competence of the Scottish parliament. Successive British prime ministers—including staunch opponents of devolution like Margaret Thatcher—have recognised the Scottish people's right to self-determination. So have supporters of devolution like Donald Dewar. So the last hurdle is the lowest of all. But much bigger ones must be cleared first. If the unionist parties keep their cool, the SNP may not manage to progress far down the long road towards independence. It will have to settle instead for the prize of governing Scotland. That is not necessarily to be spurned; it is what the Catalan and Basque nationalist parties have been doing for the last 25 years. But Catalonia and the Basque region are still part of Spain.