Playing the long game

The Tories have everything to gain from a Scottish independence referendum in 2010: the SNP, and New Labour, have everything to lose
November 23, 2008

Support for the union has been a cornerstone of Conservative policy for two centuries. At the Scottish Conservative Conference in May 2008, David Cameron spoke of "the ugly stain of separatism…seeping through our union flag" and reaffirmed his opposition to Scottish independence. "I do not want to be the prime minister of England. I want to be prime minister of the United Kingdom - all of it, including Scotland."

Yet not a word about the union appears on the party's website, which promises only to "address the West Lothian question and give English MPs a decisive say on laws that affect only England." And it was Cameron himself who pointed out in August 2006 "that the policies of Conservatives in Scotland and Wales will not always be the same as our policies in England." Having been cunningly outflanked by Blair in 1997 on traditional Tory issues such as law and order, the party is all too wary of being outmanoeuvred on its own ground yet again: this time by Brown's flagrant playing of the patriotism card. Adopting the recommendations of Ken Clarke's democracy taskforce for exclusive voting rights for English MPs over England-only legislation is as far as Cameron can safely go without triggering Labour accusations of union-busting. Yet in the words of one Tory grandee, there is a strand of thinking—very much still a minority within the party—that would welcome Scottish independence, as it might mean the reduction of Labour MP's and the enhanced prospects of Conservative governments. Even the right-wing Adam Smith Institute published a report in April 2007 arguing that independence would be good for Scotland's economy, predicting that it could precipitate growth of up to 7 per cent in just 5 years. And it's worth remembering that before Salmond's makeover, the SNP had much more in common ideologically with the Conservatives than Labour; in the 1970s, their right-wing policies earned the nickname the "tartan Tories."

For a maverick few in the Tory party, the passive and reluctant enablement of Scottish independence could prove the Cameron era's accidental trump card. It is an open Holyrood secret that Salmond has postponed the referendum till 2010 for one reason. As Robert Hazell points out (Prospect, July 2008), a Conservative government in Westminster offers the best hope of converting Salmond's personal popularity into a majority for independence. Even after Salmond's robust opening year as first minister, support for independence struggles to break through 30 per cent. Tom Gallagher (Prospect, September 2008) has highlighted Scotland's low election turnouts, the SNP's pitiful membership numbers and its reliance on personality rather than policy as evidence of the significant obstacles to independence. Nor has Salmond shown his usual magic touch in handling the fallout from the banking crisis. Far from inflaming nationalist passions, the £37bn bailout of Scotland's two flagship banks, the Royal Bank and the Bank of Scotland, has emphasised the usefulness of Britain's bigger financial muscle. Salmond is struggling to counter unionist claims that an independent Scotland could not have saved its banks from the global credit meltdown; his recent accusation of "smear, fear and misinformation" against the unionist cause smacked of desperation.

It is a struggle that he cannot afford to lose. Cohabitation on a permanent basis with a sovereign Westminster government is not an option for Salmond. Even his fabled political skills could not sell such a U-turn in the SNP's core objective. But Cameron would be under no such constraints as he forms his administration two years from now. He could carry on in peaceful negotiation with the devolved Scottish Assembly, or await the charge of the SNP brigade into the referendum. Having for so long been expected to launch his challenge to "unrepresentative" Tory rule from Westminster, Salmond could hardly duck the issue when and if it is presented to him after a Cameron victory in 2010.

Throughout that 2010 referendum campaign, Cameron's Tory government could take plenty of blows north of the border from a rampant, dominant Salmond. Like Muhammed Ali when he faced George Foreman in 1974, the Tories could stand in the line of fire, offering an apparently robust defence of their unionist position. Salmond will only get his independent Scotland if he can beat the current odds and push through 50 per cent on a tidal wave of Tory-bashing. But the real loser will be the absent fighter: New Labour and its pretensions to govern England and Wales again. For why should the Tories try too hard to stop Salmond? Let him punch away. They can take the hits and give themselves hegemony south of the border.

Of course, it's not impossible for Labour to beat the Tories in England: Atlee did in 1945, Wilson in 1966, and Blair in 1997, 2001 and 2005. But in all the other postwar elections, Labour has trailed the Tories in English constituencies. Nor was Blair's thinning English majority in 2005 made of sustainable stuff. Since then, the Electoral Commission's boundary revisions will make it even harder for Labour to win. And the victories Labour has won in England were achieved either at a feverish social moment like 1945, or against a Tory party tarnished by echoes of the grouse moor (1966) or social antipathy (1997, 2001 and 2005). A normal, modern Tory party could reasonably expect to carry England in all bar moments of extreme unpopularity. It is the natural party of middle England.

It's not enough of an open-and-shut case for the Tories to risk charges of disloyalty by appearing to backslide in their support for the union. But it might be enough to make them think twice before investing too much political capital in its defence.