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Niger, lies and uranium

Why did the Bush administration endorse a forgery about Iraq's nuclear programme? Did it come from British intelligence?

By Seymour M Hersh   June 2003

On 24th September 2001, as the US Congress prepared to vote on the resolution authorising President George W Bush to wage war in Iraq, a group of senior intelligence officials, including George Tenet, the director of central intelligence, briefed the Senate foreign relations committee on Iraq’s weapons capability. It was an important presentation for the Bush administration. Some Democrats were publicly questioning the president’s claim that Iraq still possessed weapons of mass destruction which posed an immediate threat to the US. Just the day before, Al Gore had criticised the administration’s advocacy of pre-emptive war, calling it a doctrine that…

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