Hearts and minds

A ten-point plan for solving the difficulties of the occupation in Iraq
January 20, 2004

With each new day another explosion goes off, another soldier is killed, the civilian death count rises and a few more Iraqis turn against the American presence. The real battle is one of perceptions. The coalition's daily struggle is to prove to Iraqis that an Iraq without Saddam is far better than one with the dictator; more importantly, they must prove that working with the coalition will improve their lot and make Iraq a better place. It's a tough sell.

Yet in the battle for hearts and minds, some of the most effective solutions may in fact be rather simple. Only a few measures are needed to make more Iraqis feel part of the reconstruction, citizens of their own land. And for all the tanks and arms, all the troops and the dollars spent, the best solutions are also rather inexpensive. The following is my bluffer's guide for the reconstruction of the reconstruction.

1. Encourage reconciliation, not revenge. Having decided soon after L Paul Bremer arrived in May to disband the Iraqi army and opt for a full-blooded de-Ba'athification, the Coalition Provisional Authority (the US-led executive body in Iraq) has in the past few weeks been backpedalling somewhat. Some Ba'ath party members, especially those who were in key jobs, are being invited back. On almost every day in November, at least one former Ba'athist was killed returning to the ministry of education in Basra for a job interview. Meanwhile, former policemen and security officers are being killed in Baghdad. Yet gangs taking revenge on former Ba'athists are doing so with impunity.

After 35 years of tyranny, Iraq has deep wounds to heal. But in taking such a tough stance against those connected to the former regime, the occupation has created new wounds. South Africa's truth and reconciliation commission is surely the example to follow here. It gave citizens public answers to the deaths or disappearances of loved ones, while meting out relatively civilised punishment to those responsible. Until Iraqis are able to get such answers, they will seek retribution of a more brutal kind. Only public reconciliation can allow the nation to put its dark past behind it. That must certainly include trials of the worst criminals - and such trials are expected to begin soon. But the process must emphasise closure on the past, and rebirth for the nation.

The CPA must speak the language of unity, not sectarianism. For decades discourse in Iraq has been based on divisiveness and sectarianism. And too often the CPA has used the same language. Iraqis are lumped together as Shi'is, or Sunnis, or Kurds; their backgrounds used to define political stance or demeanour. Rumours continue to make the rounds that new identification cards will highlight the ethnic and religious background of Iraqis.

Such divisiveness has been harnessed by factions and parties for political gain. Talk of radical federalism continues to fan fears that the nation will be ripped apart, and recent pieces in the New York Times and the Times calling for the break-up of the country into three parts underline such fears. The coalition must break that cycle, opting instead to highlight the unity of the nation - addressing people as Iraqi citizens first.

2. Begin the constitution discussion. Perhaps the most important conversation Iraq must have is about its future constitution. If conducted properly, this debate will spur discussions on the big issues: federalism, minority rights, secularism and religion's role in society. It will provide Iraqis with a genuine roadmap out of occupation. Yet the conversation has yet to begin. Mired in politics and logistical challenges, initial plans to begin drafting a constitution have been put on hold until the appropriate political structures of an interim government are cemented. But such controversy need not filibuster the discussion. This summer, 25 elders and legal scholars were sent around the country to determine the rules of how a constitution should be drafted. They spoke to thousands of Iraqis and began a civilised debate. Their report has collected dust on the desks of members of the Iraqi Governing Council (the US-appointed body that has served as the Iraqi executive alongside the coalition). The group should be empowered to continue its work, and to keep the constitution at the top of the agenda. The conversation will take a long time; by the time a true constitutional convention is held, Iraq will have had time to mull the issues as an entire nation.

3. Add portals to security walls. As security walls rise ever higher, the coalition's daunting fortresses have left Iraqis alienated from the halls of power. The walls have become symbolic of the exclusion of Iraqis from their own government, encouraging conspiracy theorists and grumblers. Throughout the world's capitals, builders make a point of leaving portholes and windows into construction sites, allowing citizens to develop a connection with the project as it rises. So too should Iraqis be allowed to peer in behind the walls, seeing what is happening without disturbing the security of those behind the walls.

One way of doing this would be to televise all meetings of the IGC and other Iraqi institutions. The main issue dogging almost all new institutions in Iraq is a lack of legitimacy. Iraqis simply don't trust institutions such as the IGC and the coalition-appointed local councils. The distrust has served to cloud some of the accomplishments of these nascent institutions.

Allowing television cameras into the council chambers and allowing citizens to tune in at any time, as with the American C-Span and the BBC Parliament channels, would provide Iraqis a window into the nation-building process. They will be able to watch potential leaders in action, people who are speaking in their name. They will be able to refute for themselves the more outlandish conspiracy theories they hear on the street. Such a move would also encourage council members to attend more regularly and work harder. There is, of course, the risk of grandstanding before the cameras - but council members do that even without cameras, and with them they have more to gain in the court of public opinion.

4. Allow the formation of a new Ba'ath party. Much as the CPA decided to form a new Iraq police force in May and a new Iraqi army in August, a new Ba'ath party would allow former Ba'athists to come out of their basements, and out of the clutches of Saddam's loyalists to whom many have had to turn in desperation. By banning all Ba'athists, the occupation failed to distinguish "good" Ba'athists from "bad." It lumped together schoolteachers - who joined the party to improve their chances of promotion - with war criminals. The ban made some decent Iraqis into outlaws. Bremer and his team turned a washed-up group into a resistance movement. Just as Russia's communists were able to recreate themselves, Iraq's Ba'athists must be brought back into the legal world. Those who choose to remain in the underworld can then easily be dismissed as criminals - and punished.

5. Investigate and stamp out corruption. The endemic corruption which was a hallmark of the previous regime has returned in the eight months of the occupation. Kickbacks and bribes have remained normal in the sale of government property or the establishment of new businesses. Constant rumours of bribery and corruption in contracting have sullied the entire reconstruction process and reinforced the beliefs of cynics who see the new regime as simply another version of the old.

By investigating corruption and publicly reprimanding those engaged in it, the coalition could show that the rules have changed. So far, it has appeared incapable of ensuring that a new order takes hold. But there is a good model for the CPA here. Under the tutelage of Bernard Kerik, the former New York police chief who came to Baghdad to train the police, the new force took to publicly reprimanding police who accepted bribes or engaged in racketeering. Citizens and police are now encouraged to report corruption and their tips are investigated by an internal affairs division. This has helped fashion a new image for the Iraqi police as fighting for the cause of the ordinary man. Today, the police stand as the real heroes of the occupation in Iraqi eyes.

6. Know when security is humiliation. In the face of the crime wave that ensued after the war, Iraqis begged for some form of security. In Baghdad the decision to protect only the oil ministry in the heavy looting straight after the war was a bad mistake - and a gift to the conspiracy theorists. The coalition's current answer to the security problem is to add more checkpoints, but for Iraqis this too often means humiliation at the hands of American soldiers who do not speak their language. It is now, thankfully, possible to find Iraqi policemen at more checkpoints, able to distinguish (as US soldiers cannot) between a respected sheikh who speaks no English and a criminal who does. But the coalition must go further and acknowledge itself as the outsider. Only with that attitude can it succeed in winning over increasingly sensitive Iraqis.

7. Protect theatres and places of public gatherings. Missing in much of Iraq over the past eight months has been culture and the arts, absent due mainly to the breakdown in security. Numerous bombings of cinemas in cities like Mosul - some of them admittedly in pornographic theatres - have kept most such gatherings off limits to all but the bravest.

In July, the Baghdad Symphony Orchestra held its first concert since the war. But it was held at Baghdad's convention centre, controlled by US forces, and only a select few Iraqis and the press were invited. The CPA must do more to encourage such events and bring wider audiences to them.

8. Enforce traffic rules. The marvel of Baghdad is that the traffic moves at all. Driving the wrong way on a motorway is common and traffic lights are regarded as mere ornaments. The once feared traffic police only occasionally try to intervene. But as "broken windows" policies have shown the world over, as long as minor infractions continue unpunished, any future government's authority will be undermined.

At an intersection recently, a group of policemen decided to do something about the matter. They stepped in front of an oncoming mass of cars driving the wrong way to avoid a traffic jam. The guards fired their guns in the air and sent the cars back. Those stuck in the traffic jam cheered the police and applauded with their horns. Imagine what could happen if the rules were constantly enforced - without gunfire.

9. Avoid any discussion of Israel. The subject of Israel is a litmus test for the occupation. For most Iraqis, the Israeli-Palestinian issue was always a foil for their subjugation. Indeed, one of the more significant details of Iraq today is a rebellion against the old Arabist stance of "Palestine first."

But Iraqis still see Israel as, at worst, an adversary or, at best, a colonial power, and many see the occupation as a tool for Israel. Recent pronouncements by Bremer on Israel were seen as proof of an underlying conspiracy. The CPA must make sure to leave any discussion of Iraq's relationship to Israel to a democratically elected government with the authority to make such pronouncements.

10. Clean up the skyline. The skyline of Baghdad, as of most Iraqi cities, is pockmarked by bombed-out, charred and looted buildings. They are the daily reminders of a war that does not seem to end, and a constant reminder of the terrible times the nation is facing. Bring down the buildings and build anew, and let the nation do the same.