Could the media save Afghanistan?

Mobile phone ownership is widespread and radio stations have flourished, but the Americans still keep a tight grip on the media. It's time to consider a more open approach
July 7, 2010

President Obama’s new man in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, is widely credited with turning around the disastrous American campaign in Iraq. But the task he now faces may prove more difficult. His recently departed predecessor, General Stanley McChrystal, was widely praised for pulling together Nato’s first coherent counter-insurgency strategy and implementing it despite the doubts of many of his own forces. He won their trust—as well as that of President Hamed Karzai despite the increasingly frosty relations between the Afghan and US governments. Yet despite McChrystal’s best efforts and the “surge” of additional US forces, the military strategy is still in trouble. And General Petraeus’s strategic options are narrowing fast.

There is one opportunity, however, that Petraeus should consider, and that is working with one of Afghanistan’s few success stories: the deregulated mass media. Using this resource, as well as the phenomenal recent growth of mobile phone ownership, he could stimulate a national debate on the future direction of the country. As David Kilkullen, a leading counter-insurgency scholar, has written in his new book The Accidental Guerrilla, insurgencies in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia will be won through “the decisive battle…for people’s minds.”

So, could the Afghan media be part of the answer? Publications such as the US Army’s Field Manual 3-07 (2008) and the British military’s Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution (2009) have embraced greater media transparency by the military and recognise that creating access to information is a vital building block for lasting peace. But the emphasis here is on “strategic messaging”: building controlled information campaigns, rather than helping the Afghan media become an effective platform for discussion and debate.

And this is a major problem. Afghans are canny media users, quick to sense when they are being manipulated. They have had 30 years of propaganda by many shades of governments, from Communist to Islamic extremist. A 2008 survey in the conflict hotspots of Kandahar and Helmand provinces indicated that constant messaging by the Afghan ministries of defence and counter narcotics was undermining the credibility of local radio stations.

There will always be a place for military information operations: simple, practical messages to save civilians lives in war zones. But continuing a near-exclusive policy of information control is harmful—not only is the messaging often ineffective, but it hugely inflates TV and radio airtime costs, provides no incentive for Afghan broadcasters to improve their own programmes, and undermines the credibility of the local media. It is clear that this approach is not working.

In contrast, the propaganda of al Qaeda and its allies is working rather well. Violent extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan regularly use SMS messages, DVDs of suicide attacks, magazines, songs, poetry and radio broadcasts to get their message to local people—as well as to inform the western media of their military operations, many of which are staged primarily for propaganda value. Such is their influence that the Taliban have successfully coerced Afghanistan’s three mobile phone operators to cut their networks after 4pm each day in several southern provinces, in order to minimise the risk of being informed on when they plant roadside bombs or carry out other military operations.

The allies urgently need a new approach. Thanks to the huge growth of mobile phone ownership in Afghanistan (as well as Pakistan and Somalia), many marginalised Afghans can, for the first time, make their views known through phone-in programming on one of the 100 or so private and community-owned radio stations in the country. If they chose to do so, much of the infrastructure is there for the Afghan government, ISAF and others to engage people in a debate on issues ranging from education for girls to building consent for a negotiated peace settlement.

The Afghan government could also gain badly-needed legitimacy amongst Afghans by listening to peoples’ views and acting on their concerns. Communication tools such as Frontline SMS can be used to collate text messages and provide a snapshot of public opinion on different issues. Research from Pakistan shows that even poorly-educated people regularly text in Urdu using Roman characters.

The Voice of America’s Radio Deewa, broadcasting in Pashto to the badlands of the Pakistan-Afghan frontier, has shown how much potential there is here: in the past two years, the number of pro-Taliban callers to popular daily phone-in programmes in the region has declined after their views were very publicly and successfully challenged on air. Many Islamic militants have a sketchy knowledge of their religion, and their views often do not stand up to serious scrutiny. And as the experience gained from communicating about the risks of HIV/AIDS shows, people are much more likely to change their views or do things differently if they are involved in the debate—weighing up the arguments and being agents of their own change—rather than being preached at.

There is one significant sign of progress: in May, the American Embassy in Kabul made available a substantial fund—with grants ranging from $500 to $10m—to “expand media engagement” with Afghans, build ties between people (and with the US), and to counter extremist voices.

The participatory role of media, however, is still seen as a threat by many: those in the Afghan government who are not used to being criticised by the local media, the insurgents who prefer their views to go unchallenged, and to ISAF field commanders who fear that greater openness risks the lives of soldiers. So the support of the Afghan government and ISAF is vital if the American fund is to succeed in nudging Afghan society towards peace. And the British government should champion the initiative with both funds and diplomatic support. Above all, we should help prepare Afghan ministers for the brickbats (along with the plaudits) involved in being regularly quizzed by the Afghan people. The media and telecommunications sector is one of Afghanistan’s few recent success stories. With thoughtful support, it could now play a key role in building a lasting peace in the country.