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Why Iraq war films fail

Tom Streithorst

A US army private based deep in the Sunni “triangle of death” south of Baghdad put it piquantly to me in May 2007: “We’re a reality show everybody’s bored of.” The soldiers know that nobody cares. According to minute-by-minute television ratings, viewers switch off as soon as an Iraq story hits air. When Siegfried Sassoon wrote his poems, and when Erich Remarque wrote All Quiet on the Western Front, much of their audience had lived through the same hell. During both the world wars, the entire nation was involved, and the experience of the soldiers was an intrinsic part of the national psyche. Not any more. I’ve met dozens of soldiers who, since the invasion, have served three or more tours in the warzone, spent more time with their platoons than with their families—and yet they realise that, back home, nobody knows or is interested in what they have been through.

Hollywood also recognises that the Iraq war is bad box office. Even winning the Oscar didn’t goose The Hurt Locker’s ticket sales much. In mid March it barely beat Tooth Fairy on the earnings list in America. On the same three days as Tim Burton’s critically panned Alice in Wonderland grossed $62m, The Hurt Locker only took in $800,000. The big-budget Green Zone also opened to disappointing numbers. And yet, thankfully, some film and documentary makers still feel compelled to explore the topic. More than 30 movies have been made about the Iraq war. Considering how little the average person knows—or cares—about the conflict, we urgently need these films to tell us what is going on. Do they succeed?

Kathryn Bigelow’s Oscar-triumphing Hurt Locker brilliantly evokes the look and texture of Iraq, with shaky handheld camera shots of armoured Humvees travelling through dusty boulevards. It also succeeds in showing the intense relationships men forge with their comrades by working together in war, and how the adrenaline rush of risking your life can make the ordinary world a little bland. Yet its story, of a “cowboy” bomb disposal specialist habitually putting his team and himself in grave danger, is naïve and inaccurate. In Iraq, “force protection” is emphasised above all else. Putting your men in unnecessary danger is utterly unacceptable; not at all part of the corporate culture. “Cowboys” in the real American military, unlike the ones in the film, are not reckless with their own or their comrades’ lives, but with the lives of non-Americans. So while one could argue that The Hurt Locker is a great war film, it is certainly not a great Iraq war film. Iraq is just the landscape for a tale that could be set in any random conflict.

Other films are based on actual stories from Iraq. Brian DePalma’s Redacted (2007) is the fictionalised retelling of the brutal rape and murder of a young Iraqi girl in Mahmudiyah, and the response of the jihadis, who captured American soldiers from the same company and beheaded them on camera. Meanwhile Nick Broomfield’s Battle for Haditha shows the massacre of innocent Iraqi civilians by a US Marine platoon in frenzied revenge after one of their own had been killed by a roadside bomb. Using documentary style and improvised ensemble acting, both films look realistic enough, but most of the characters, unfortunately, are two-dimensional. We know Specialist Rush is a redneck nutter because De Palma shoots him sprawling under a Confederate flag, while Broomfield’s villagers are a textbook loving family turned into innocent victims.

Perhaps more importantly, by focusing exclusively on these terrible war crimes, the films give a misleading impression of the US army in Iraq. In my experience, the military is extremely well disciplined and obeys the rules of war. Yes, thousands of innocent Iraqis have been killed by the Americans, but the great majority of them have been killed by mistake: because of misunderstandings and mutual incomprehension rather than through deliberate brutality. The classic example is the family ordered in shouted English to slow down at a checkpoint and when, for whatever reason they don’t, a nervous soldier opens fire, killing mom and dad, leaving screaming children covered in blood in the backseat. In a way, this much too typical accident is just as reprehensible, if less cinematic than the much rarer deliberate murder.

A whole slew of other films don’t even attempt to show Iraq, other than in hallucinogenic flashback. In the Valley of Elah (2007), for example, tells the story of a father whose son has been murdered within days of his return from war. Our sympathies here are with the normal Americans back home. The soldiers are seen as damaged, alien. Their experience has more to do with the clichés of war films than the actual day-to-day life of soldiers serving in Iraq.

Heavy Metal in Baghdad, by contrast, offers a unique and refreshing perspective. In 2003, Vice magazine published an article about an Iraqi heavy metal band and then returned to Iraq in 2006 (right in the middle of the Shia-sunni civil war) to make a documentary about these four Iraqi musicians. Unlike most Iraq war films, Americans play a minor role and the documentary fluently demonstrates the hell that Iraq became a few years after the invasion. Our sympathies are with the Iraqis, in part because they share an obsession with a western subculture—something tangible that audiences can relate to.

However, the newly-released Green Zone (which could have been titled “The Bourne Conspiracy Goes to Iraq”) is probably my favourite. It is big-budget Hollywood, fun to watch; its hero an incredibly dedicated soldier who doesn’t think twice about disobeying his superiors (something soldiers don’t do), but it does try to answer a big question: why did the Americans dismantle the Iraqi army, when it was their only chance to hold the country together? While the film is utterly inaccurate in its particulars, it is, I believe, truthful about the bigger picture. America failed in Iraq in large part because the men running the war were more interested in perceptions back home than the reality on the ground.

On and off, I have spent several years in Iraq and if there is one thing that strikes me it is the remarkable separation between the occupiers and the occupied. The Americans live on base or in fortified compounds. They meet few Iraqis that have not been vetted. Almost no Americans speak Arabic. Incomprehension is endemic. I’m sure more than a few soldiers have gone through their year-long tour and not had a conversation with a single Iraqi. This is unprecedented. In Vietnam, American soldiers had Vietnamese girlfriends, sometimes rented apartments, mixed often with the general population. So did the Germans in Paris, and the Russians in Berlin. The film I would like to see is one about this apartheid and how it led to disaster. The Iraq war was forged in a bubble, and fought in a bubble. It is a tragedy that deserves its Tolstoy. It still awaits its Francis Ford Coppola.

In fact

Prospect

In Britain, 47% of households with a cat have at least one person educated to degree level, compared to 38% of homes with dogs.
The Veterinary Record, February 2010

Half of Turkey’s 400 or so murders a year are “honour killings.”
Guardian, 4th February 2010

The 2010 Super Bowl had an average of 106.5m viewers—beating the US record for a television audience previously set by the final episode of M*A*S*H in 1983.
New York Times, 8th February 2010

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Have we learnt more from Iraq than Campbell has?

Tom Streithorst
campbell_shabby_mail_8oct06

Campbell has learnt nothing from the Iraq war

To a hammer, every problem is a nail. Alastair Campbell tells us, in today’s Financial Times, that the main lesson we should take from the Iraq debacle is that next time we invade a minor third world country, government officials need to spin it better. Considering that Bush and Blair, back in 2003 were able to drag our countries into war, despite little genuine cause and massive popular opposition, I would have thought that spin was one of the few Iraq war government policies that actually succeeded.

Let us not forget: Saddam Hussein, although a despicable tyrant, had no weapons of mass destruction.  He was a threat to no one but his own people and few of them, by the way, are now grateful for our invasion. Our optimism, brute force, cowardice and pathetic planning turned a totalitarian state into something even worse, an anarchic hellhole. I will never forget, in 2006, being told by a man who had spent 6 years in Saddam’s jails how much better things were under the Ba’athist regime. Today, much of the Iraqi middle class is in exile, hundreds of thousands have died, violence still endemic, the economy in tatters.

The war devastated Iraq; it damaged us as well. The international reputation of Britain and the United States have suffered, we have wasted trillions of dollars, thousands of our soldiers lives, and accomplished almost nothing.  The big winner in Iraq is Iran and the fundamentalist Shia groups allied with it.   If the war’s purpose was to control Iraq’s oil, that plan too was a failure. The civil war years cut Iraqi production to a fraction of its pre-invasion levels and in the recent oil field auction, Russian, Chinese, Angolan oil companies secured more of Iraq’s oil than American and British companies, without their militaries having to go to the trouble of invading.

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The old boys’ club

Jean Seaton

Christopher Meyer at the Iraq war inquiry: a vain popinjay


The Iraq war inquiry, which began during November, is the last redoubt of the tie. These are fast disappearing from public life, superseded by the studied informality of open-necked shirts. But, seemingly in defiance of sofa government, they fly like pennants here at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre in Westminster.

Indeed, the proceedings are really just an elegy for chaps in suits—an affecting display of the varieties of masculine thinking and ways of being of a particular sort of man: not just military types or politicians, but public service man. As we went to war, the witnesses were at the height of their careers. Because of the generation that it was, they were also all men. Most of the inquiry members are chaps, although the secretariat that serves it is the blonde, feminised future (though they all wear black suits too).

There is a hint of melancholy wistfulness to the procession of witnesses. Tall, handsome, saturnine military men; small austere men; charming men; creepy men; and diligent men. Then you have the oddity of our former US ambassadors: the vain popinjay Christopher Meyer, condemned to the hell of being himself, alongside the impressive David Manning—both seeming, as do the others, like overblown roses.

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Prospect online this week: Armando Iannucci in profile

Tom Chatfield
Remember this? A British protest against Gulf War Two

Remember this? A British protest against Gulf War Two

With his first feature film, In The Loop, due to hit British cinemas this coming Friday, Armando Iannucci is arguably this country’s most prominent political satirist; and, after a rapturous critical reception for the film at the Sundance festival, you might expect him to be pretty pleased with himself. When author and critic Hans Kundnani caught up with Iannucci to watch In The Loop and profile its author for this week’s Prospect web exclusive, however, he found someone both angrier and more elusive than this; a man caught between his duty to the kind of pure, painfully funny comedy he helped create in shows like The Day Today and I’m Alan Partridge, and his urge to speak truth to power by creating an exaggerated but accurate parallel political world. For a man whose great horror of Tony Blair was that he was “an actor,” fiction, it seems, has proved an especially slippery mode of attack; and his vision of a world in which a middle-eastern country is invaded by a US-led force on the basis of dubious intelligence treads a fine line between fact and fable. As ever, let us know your own thoughts below.

How the British finally won in Basra

Mary Fitzgerald
Colonal Iron: the saviour of Basra?

Colonel Iron: the saviour of Basra?

The media and the public at large has been scathing about Britain’s involvement in Iraq: it is widely deemed both a political and military disaster, and the only option for British troops now seems to be a full—and humiliating—withdrawal. While terrible mistakes were made, this is not the whole story, reports Anthony King in an in-depth feature for our latest issue. In particular, it ignores the heroics of one man: Colonel Richard Iron, and the hitherto untold story of the dramatic “Charge of the Knights” attack to take back Basra.

Give the success of this bold mission, the last thing the British government should now be contemplating is total disengagement from Basra; not least because 178 British soldiers and several thousand Basrawis died fighting there. We now have a second chance to get it right in Iraq.