Politics

The UK's last chance saloon

January 12, 2012
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The battle for Scotland began in earnest this week with David Cameron’s offer to give Alex Salmond the power to hold a decisive referendum on independence—but only if that referendum is held “sooner rather than later,” and only if it is on a clear in-or-out vote.

Salmond’s response has been equally bold. Ignoring Westminster he has declared that the referendum will be held in the autumn of 2014, and is refusing to rule out a third option of more powers by insisting that the referendum must be “made, built and run” in Scotland. A major constitutional crisis is brewing which may only be resolved by a protracted fight in the courts.

On the surface of it, the logic behind Cameron’s decision is obvious. Polls consistently put support for independence around the 30 per cent mark, meaning that an early in-or-out vote would give him the best possible chance of winning. Ideally, he would like to stop the Scottish government from holding the referendum at the time most convenient to the cause of Scottish nationalism: the 700th anniversary of the Battle of Bannockburn.

Moreover, he wants to deprive Salmond of a third option: the consolation prize of “devolution-max,” which would not only hand the SNP control of all domestic affairs north of the border, but which would also allow him to keep the political momentum with the SNP, even if they lose the vote on independence.

Since the two goverments look set to clash over the timing of referendum and especially the question put to Scottish voters, it is worth asking whether Cameron's rationale—one shared by all unionist parties—stacks up.

An early referendum might scupper SNP plans but it shouldn’t be assumed that it will automatically help the forces of unionism. Are they really ready to do battle with the undisputed king of Scottish politics? To win they can’t simply gamble on the fact that polls indicate only minority support for independence. They will have to advance a compelling account of why the Union matters in the 21st century—something they have signally failed to articulate in recent years.

In the absence of a positive argument in favour of union, an early referendum would in all likelihood see them forced into running a negative and entirely counter-productive campaign about how an independent Scotland wouldn’t be able to survive in the world. These scare tactics no longer work. Just ask Scottish Labour, which has lost two elections doing just that.

In many important respects the SNP are much better prepared than the Union camp. They have amassed an impressive war chest for their campaign, they have a slick ground-operation in place, and they have a senior team to front it. The unionist parties, in contrast, can't even decide who should lead a no campaign. A referendum in the second half of the parliament might suit the SNP, but equally it might give unionist parties the time they need to get their act together too. It wouldn't surprise me if Westminster let Salmond have his 2014 date.

The UK government will, however, be much more resistant to making concessions about the question. From a unionist perspective, it is easy to see why they are reluctant to give Salmond a fall-back option. But they need to recognise that their refusal to countenance more powers runs the risk of further weakening their appeal in Scotland. Unlike independence, “devo max” is something which a clear majority of them say they support. A recent Ipsos Mori poll found that 68 per cent of Scottish voters said they would back a “devolution-max” proposal. By blocking Scots the right to vote for more powers it might encourage them to support the more radical separatist option.

Rather than ruling out more powers in principle, the UK government could commit ahead of the referendum to devolving significant powers to Scotland, should Scots decide to stay in the union. These powers would need to be agreed in advance (no mean feat as the three main parties are durrently divided on this issue) so that Scots trust the UK government to deliver on them. The attractions of such an approach is that it makes a “no” vote in any referendum a positive vote and it puts unionism firmly on the side of mainstream public opinion in Scotland.

Alternatively, the UK government could back a third option and then campaign vigorously for a new, devolved settlement—an approach which would force the SNP to make their case for independence. It is only by becoming the champions of greater devolution within the UK that unionism will really recapture the political initiative in Scotland.