Politics

Five questions for Central Europe

The shifting scope of Central Europe provokes a number of questions about its future

October 08, 2013
What is the future?
What is the future?

Almost 30 years ago, Timothy Garton Ash asked in his famous essay, “Does Central Europe exist?” The title illustrated the general attitude of Western societies, for whom everything east of Germany was a blank spot on the map.

However, today’s Central Europe—after great changes in 1989 when Communism in Europe collapsed, in 1999 when Nato expanded to include Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, and 2004 when the EU welcomed those countries (plus Slovakia) into the fold—has become a full member of the western world with its own strong political and cultural identity. Having established that the region actually exists then, just what is it?

History offers plenty of definitions. One strand of thinking suggests that Central Europe is synonymous with Mitteleuropa, a concept that Friedrich Neumann conceived during the First World War. This highlighted that spite of the region’s multilingual character it was politically and culturally dominated by Germany. Others have argued that Central Europe was in fact born in the Habsburg Empire and the term refers only to the former territories of Austria-Hungary.

Those who define a culture by its food might be inclined towards the popular saying that Central Europe is everywhere you can have apple strudel. However, the Czech writer Josef Kroutvor came closest when he wrote that it is impossible to define a region whose main feature is territorial instability.

If Central Europe’s precise identity is disputed, at least it is nowadays easy to locate it geographically as the area between the Baltic and Adriatic Sea, with its heart in the four member states of the Visegrad Group (the so-called V4)—Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. This alliance has been key in leading the region’s Western integration. But the shifting scope of Central Europe provokes a number of questions about its future.

Question 1: Is cooperation possible within the region?

The last two decades have shown that despite differences in national interests, the Central European states—particularly within the V4—are generally able to avoid embarrassing disputes. Today’s mutual understanding and respect is an achievement that Central Europeans from the interwar period could have only dreamed about.

Yet this harmony may not last forever. Dialogue with our neighbours is like riding a bicycle—without pedalling, the bike will stop and fall over. Petty nationalisms, historical resentments and minority problems may all resurface sooner or later, especially in an era of economic turmoil.

This should encourage the improvement of shared infrastructure, as well as strong civic ties, which are surprisingly weak. For example, it is challenging to get from one Central European city to another. As the exchange between societies in the region stagnates, relations may be left in the hands of politicians, especially populists, who are always happy to exploit a lack of popular knowledge for their purposes. The bike, indeed, would be still riding on, but nobody can be sure which direction it will take.

Question 2: Is Central Europe able to work together as a region within the EU?

The Visegrad Four with their non-institutional, informal character counterbalances the centralised power of the EU system, proving that it is possible to sustain cooperation for 20 years through shared goals, rather than relying on treaty obligations. Even if one limits Central Europe only to the V4, it would appear that within the EU there is a powerful structure with nearly 65 million people, a substantial gross national income ($260 billion) and the same number of voices in the European Council as France or Germany.

In thinking about the future of Europe, the Central European states should focus on two vital issues. Firstly, mindful of their countries’ historical experiences, regional leaders could push to strengthen of the EU’s common security policy. This could involve structured cooperation between smaller groupings of member states. One may be surprised why Central Europe—the most unstable part of the continent in the 20th Century—has not yet emerged as an avant-garde lobby for pressing the EU to become more serious about its security.

Engagement with Europe’s eastern and southern periphery is the second obvious focus for the V4 countries, which together make up part of the EU’s borderland. The Balkan conflict of the 1990s illustrates what kind of actions those in surrounding areas may take if they were isolated from the EU.

In addition to this, there is the question of managing economic change. Here lies the greatest potential danger for Central Europe. There are strong divisions between the countries not only in terms of currency, with Slovakia a member of the Eurozone, but also in regards to more fundamental issues such as deepening European integration or actions to deal with the crisis. If Central European countries do not succeed in working better collectively, it is very likely that the worrying scenario of a “two-speed Europe” will be played out in the region, dividing it into winners and losers consisting of a pro-European heart and a non-influential periphery. For both sides, this would be a step backwards: one will have frustrated neighbours across its borders, while the other will have to find somewhere adequate alternative to its diminished European activity.

Question 3: Is the region still caught between Germany and Russia?

It has been a consistent theme of the past that temperatures in Central Europe rise when the two great neighbours and exponents of different civilizations – Germany and Russia – started to get along with each other over the region’s heads. Today, links with these contrasting powers offer an array of benefits. Germany is not only a stable and reliable democracy, but also the most important economic and political partner for almost all countries in the region. Meanwhile Russia, whilst becoming less of a military power, offers economic and energy tools which recommend it as a suitable ally for Central Europe.

However, in negotiating the balance between these two countries it seems reasonable to maintain the integrity of both the EU and NATO. In the past, two major steps were undertaken to avoid unfortunate scenarios. First was always to engage at least one side in a broader arrangement that reached beyond its narrow national interests. Secondly, Central Europe strove to consider either Germany or Russia an external protector. Neither of these approaches was particularly successful, of course, but an appreciation of previous mistakes creates greater self-awareness and regional cooperation.

As for the potential dangers, Russia has been playing a good game of divide and rule in the region. This is due to different historical experiences and cultural ties, economic interests and informal influences. With Germany there is a different problem: Central Europe’s huge dependence on trade from the country, coupled with its de facto leadership of the EU results in growing uncertainty about what will happen if the economic crisis eventually hits Berlin.  All this provides good reason to once again start thinking about geopolitics, and whether Germany or Russia would make a more beneficial ally.

Question 4: Is Central Europe still key on a global level?

Without going back to both World Wars, which started there, the highpoint for Central Europe was at the cusp of the 1990s, when all eyes were focused on the region’s return to liberty. Today things are very different, and the area risks being forgotten by global powers.

While the EU is desperately searching for a way out of deep economic and institutional crises, the U.S. has focused on building a stronger multipolar order with other partners such as the BRIC group or Turkey. Central Europe, since joining the Euro-Atlantic structure has been considered by American decision-makers as a safe place where no real threats for its security exist. It seems that to Washington, the region is a mission accomplished.

In addition to this, Central Europe has become—as put by Ivan Krastev—a “retired power,” only occasionally undertaking action in the Middle East or North Africa. Operating under a set of constraints very different from those of twenty years ago, Central Europe and the U.S. will sooner or later have to build up a new partnership that would not be so engaging for the Americans. A stark choice will ultimately present itself to the region: take a greater interest in global issues or face isolation.

Question 5: Does Central Europe have the courage and intellectual resources to create a future?

Jürgen Habermas, the leading German philosopher and sociologist, famously claimed that Central Europe is unable to produce anything that would push global development in new directions. While phenomena like the Polish “Solidarity” movement seem to contradict this view, today it is clear that intellectual discourse about the future of Europe has shifted to the Western part of the continent. The current debate, of course, centres on economics, rather than politics or culture, yet it is sometimes worth listening more carefully to thinkers rather than economists.

In 1970s and 1980s, which from today’s perspective seems to be a “golden age” of Central European thinking, intellectuals such as Kundera, Milosz, Konrád or Havel made an effort to research the basis of Central European identity and open the democratic imagination of Europe.

We need ideas today that are not limited to the question of how much money the EU should give to Greece, or how the member states are supposed to cut their national budgets. In fact, Europe as we knew it no longer exists. The whole continent is undergoing a process of dramatic change, but hardly anyone is aware of what this will mean for Central Europe. If the region wants to be considered a player, it should take part in searching for a broader vision, too.