Blame the neoliberals

Some of the problems identified by Alison Wolf are real, but it is not the emancipation of women that is to blame. It is rather the neoliberal economic policies of Britain, as international comparisons make clear
May 19, 2006

In her article in the April issue of Prospect, Alison Wolf correctly describes the formal emancipation of women in "developed" societies as a "rupture in human history," but trips up in much of her commentary on the consequences of this fact. She argues that historically, women of all classes shared the same life experiences, thus rendering "women" a more or less homogeneous category. However, in contemporary societies a minority of educated women now behave as "surrogate men," following the same career paths as men in elite occupations. This has led not only to reduced or non-existent childbearing among such women, but also to the end of middle-class "female altruism," which previously had ensured a committed workforce in areas such as nursing and education, but also a supply of unpaid middle-class, working-age female volunteers for the running of a variety of charitable organisations.

Feminists, however, have long argued that this female altruism was never "natural," but socially imposed. Women have not always been seen as morally advantaged, but rather as the natural inferiors of men in all respects. As feminist historians have demonstrated, it was during the 18th and 19th centuries that the middle-class ideal of woman as the morally superior "angel of the house" was developed. Classic liberalism saw the individual as being bound by moral codes relating to social responsibility. Joan Williams has argued that the 19th-century shift from classic liberalism to possessive individualism was accompanied by the development of the "ideology of domesticity," in which "good" women "lived for others." They thus achieved the purity that allowed them to establish moral reference points for their families and for society, and increasingly, altruism became a female preserve. From this perspective, the problem identified by Wolf of declining altruism becomes not one that relates to women in particular, but rather about how to reinsert altruism into an increasingly individualised society.

This problem raises wider questions as to the manner in which competitive capitalism can adjust to the changes generated, in part, by the partial emancipation of women. Capitalism undermines the family form via its indifference to the "private" lives of the labour power it purchases; as Ulrich Beck has remarked, "The market subject is ultimately the single individual, 'unhindered' by a relationship, marriage, or family." Indeed, Wolf argues that "One could interpret today's feminist assumptions as reflecting the appetite of global capitalism for all talent, female and male, at the expense of the family." This statement, however, reflects a woeful indifference not only to debates within "today's feminism," but also to the fact that although capitalism may be "global," there are substantial differences in national policies in relation to motherhood, the family, and employment that have a marked impact on the issues under discussion in Wolf's article.

Wolf's arguments focus on the British case. However, look at the impact of institutional arrangements in other countries and you might conclude that the major problem is not, as Wolf argues, the growth of women's ambition and the decline of female altruism, but rather the failure of neoliberal policies to address the social problems she describes.

Take the question of declining fertility. This is seen by Wolf as a "problem" largely for employed elite women. Fertility rates are in decline across Europe. However, it has been demonstrated that countries which have a high participation of mothers in the workforce as well as a relatively high fertility rate are those in which national policies advocate and support maternal employment. The demographer Jeanne Fagnani's comparison of six European countries (Norway, Sweden, Britain, the Netherlands, France and Portugal) demonstrated that some trends—in particular, the increase in the age of mothers at childbirth—were occurring across all six countries. However, the countries characterised both by a substantial presence of mothers in the labour market and a relatively high fertility rate—Norway, Sweden and France—are those that have opted for policies that encourage the "working mother" model. In Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal, where both maternity and early years childcare policies are less generous, fertility is significantly lower.

Moreover, the decline in the supply of unpaid charity workers is likely to be less of a problem in countries in which the state assumes more responsibility for the welfare of its citizens as compared to the British case. Despite some recent improvement, Britain has one of the worst child poverty rates in Europe, and only Ireland has a worse poverty rate for its elderly population than Britain. In a similar vein, Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers's comparative analysis of a number of European and North American countries has shown that policies directed at early childhood education and care in the younger years have a measurable impact on the mortality rates of children under five. In Europe, child mortality rates are highest in Britain.

Wolf argues that "childbearing is a rational career choice for academically failing girls and one that a good many duly select, especially in countries where they are supported by the state." One might wonder, therefore, why teenage pregnancy rates are significantly lower in the Scandinavian countries, where state support for young mothers is more generous than in Britain. In fact, Britain has the highest rate of teenage pregnancy in Europe, and Gornick and Meyers found that teenage pregnancy rates are generally higher in countries characterised by "neoliberal" welfare regimes, and highest of all in the US.

Britain's deregulated labour market is not particularly "family-friendly," particularly for women hoping to have a career. Britain has negotiated a partial "opt-out" from the EU working time directive, and has the longest full-time working hours in Europe. The extent to which part-time work for women is a particularly "British" phenomenon (after the Netherlands, Britain has the highest proportion of part-time women workers in Europe) is sometimes not appreciated. The growth of short hours part-time working in Britain was helped by the fact that, in contrast to continental Europe, British employers were allowed to create "bad" part-time jobs. Historically, employers did not have to pay national insurance contributions for those working short hours, and employees did not have access to pension schemes, holiday entitlements and so on. The terms and conditions of part-time workers have improved, largely as a consequence of European legislation, but it remains the case that part-time work, at whatever level, is the kiss of death as far as upward career mobility is concerned.

Nevertheless, Wolf asserts that, "There is very little, if any, disadvantage associated simply with being a woman. If they are equally qualified and willing to put in the hours, they can do as well as any man." A longitudinal study by Kate Purcell and Peter Elias of men and women graduating from British universities in 1995 suggests otherwise. Seven years after graduation, there was nearly an 8 per cent difference in the earnings of male and female graduates (the "residual gender difference") even after a range of factors—including working hours, contractual status, employment sector, occupational segregation, size and location of firm, degree class and subject, post-degree qualifications, social class, age and the presence of children—had been controlled for. More detailed analysis revealed a 20 per cent gender pay gap amongst men and women graduating in the humanities, and 22 per cent in law.

In any case, the question of whether or not women are the absolute "equals" of men, it might be argued, simply misses the most important point. Wolf seems to assume that absolute equality in the employment sphere is the major priority of "mainstream feminism," but this is far from being the case. What probably most women, and an increasing minority of men, really want is a society in which both women and men can fulfil their occupational ambitions without their family dependants (particularly children) having to pay the price. This would be a society in which there are generous collective provisions for child and elder care, and in which employers would not be entitled to demand excessive hours or unreasonably increase levels of work intensity. It would also be a society in which men assumed a greater responsibility for caring and domestic work. These are the goals of what Joan Williams has described as "reconstructive feminism." Feminists, and those "on the left," have not found it "especially hard to recognise" the trends that Wolf identifies. Rather, many are doing their best to argue for the development of institutions that would enable a positive accommodation to the changes that have been brought about by the—as yet incomplete—emancipation of women.