Iraq made me believe in politics

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Iraq made me believe in politics

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A protest in London against the Iraq war. Even if the protesters didn’t get their wish, the war testified to the strength of British democracy (photo: public15)

Ten years ago the House of Commons voted in favour of invading Iraq. Through this monumental act, politicians are said to have robbed a generation of their faith in representative democracy. The two most prominent young voices of the British left have written similar articles recently about their experience of those tumultuous times. Laurie Penny and Owen Jones both attribute their generation’s disillusionment with politics to the fact that we went to war despite widespread protest. “Representative democracy failed to represent,” says Penny. “It was Iraq that exploded what trust millions had in our political establishment,” says Jones.

There are, of course, good reasons to dispute their assumption that a march, however many millions strong, should be enough to alter a government’s foreign policy, especially when that policy went to a vote in the Commons. These reasons need no rehearsing—others have done it well enough. But there is a further assumption at work, and one which should be challenged: that those who were young in 2003 were united in their pacifism, conviction and subsequent disillusionment. For some of us, Iraq was not the moment we lost faith in politics. It was the moment we understood what politics is for.

I was 20 then, politically aware but not particularly active. My abiding emotion was not anger or righteousness but confusion. The awesome complexity of the issue left me dumbstruck. I failed to take a coherent stance for or against the invasion of Iraq, opting instead for the classic fudge: yes to war, no to the manner in which war was being prosecuted. I recognised this was unsatisfactory, but thought it the best I could do given the available facts and my recognition of sharply differentiated yet equally coherent points of view. History has (at least partially) vindicated those unequivocally against the war, and I envy their conviction. But the only real winner in this story is the political system itself.

On 18th March 2003, as the great debate played out in the House of Commons—Cook’s extraordinary resignation, Conservative equivocation, the moral purity of serial Labour rebels—the system seemed to be representing not only my own confusion, but the country’s. Blair said it himself that day, in his grammatically broken but emotionally on-point style: “People who agree on everything else, disagree on this and likewise, those who never agree on anything, finding common cause. The country and parliament reflect each other, a debate that, as time has gone on has become less bitter but not less grave.”

Less bitter? For Penny and Jones, the failure of parliament to reflect the wishes of the anti-war protest was a failure of democracy. The manner in which dissent was ignored appears to them as a bitter betrayal. But for me, the debate—not just in parliament but also in the press, and in homes, shops and pubs – made things better. As we talked and talked about it—and remember that Iraq divided publics and parliaments all over the world—it became clear that there were no easy answers. Both available courses of action were fraught with danger and unintended consequences. It seemed that parliament was struggling to deal with this, just as I was. Blair again: “This House wanted this decision. Well it has it. Those are the choices. And in this dilemma, no choice is perfect, no cause ideal.”

It’s true that political disengagement is a serious problem, that parties are leaking members and that people’s trust in politicians is evaporating at an alarming rate. But it’s not true that the decision to invade Iraq was the cause, nor that this was a particular consequence for those who were young in 2003. The data tell a different story: in 2011, 41 per cent of 18-24 years felt that their participation could influence political outcomes—2 per cent more than in 2003, before the invasion.

Political disengagement is a long-term problem with long-term causes. If anything, the introduction of extremely divisive issues into the parliamentary process acts as a buffer against this trend. When I walked past parliament on the day of the equal marriage vote last month, people from both sides of the argument were demonstrating. I saw two groups converge on each other, and bent my ear to catch what I expected to be streams of invective from both sides. Instead, what I heard was reasonable debate: conviction, mixed with deliberation. The debate in the Commons that day was similarly measured. Of course, bitterness remains for those on the losing side of that vote, just as Penny, Jones and millions of others remain bitter about the decision to invade Iraq. But bitterness is a small price to pay for living in a society able to take big decisions while remaining free to argue about them.

  1. March 15, 2013

    Lee Butcher

    The problem with justifying the decision using the vote in Parliament is that parliament was misled. Depending on a person’s point of view that occurred either deliberately or accidentally. Either way parliament (and the cabinet) were given false information and so came to a decision that was flawed. In a court of law that would lead to an appeal and possibly a quashing of the original decision, however when war is committed to and forces sent on their mission there is no way back.

    The vote sadly revealed that the democratic safeguards that are meant to protect us (and the wider world) from the poor decisions of our political leaders can be too easily circumvented.

    Regarding the march and it’s relationship to our democracy, it may be better seen in it’s wider context. The anti-war march, the fox hunting march (which the left often fail to say was of similar scale to the anti-war march), the more recent tuition fees demonstrations and anti-austerity marches have all failed to get the result they set out to achieve. The past 20 years (at least) quite possibly shows that public demonstrations are in no manner helpful in changing policy.

    Make of that what you will.

    • March 15, 2013

      William Brett

      I don’t think the debate around whether Parliament was misled or not affects my argument. Even if Blair deliberately misled Parliament (and let’s at least wait for Chilcot, the third – or is it fourth? – Iraq inquiry, to report) this would be proof only of a guilty executive, not of a dysfunctional political system. The Labour rebellion and the Lib Dems gave strong representation to those against the war. And two years later, everyone had an opportunity to kick the government out. That opportunity was declined by enough people to suggest the case is not as clear-cut as some like to think. It still isn’t, and I think Parliament is good at reflecting this kind of debate.

      • March 15, 2013

        Lee Butcher

        I disagree. Because our political system was unable to tell truth from lie, or accuracy from inaccuracy, many voted to take a decision that they now admit was mistaken.

        Where an honest debate cannot happen and the evidence either invented or veiled you cannot say that Parliament was able to properly determine it’s will.

        Rather then showing that the political system worked, this example showed the inherent weaknesses in it. It showed that a more powerful executive determined to present a flawed case, alongside a large parliamentary majority for the executive, was able to get the result from the legislature it wanted arguably against the interests of the country.

        The lesson is that parliament must have access to it’s own sources of information, and must be prepared to act independently of the executive. This remains difficult with the monopoly the executive has over information on defence and security matters.

        The rebellions were not based on the evidence, but on pre-existing prejudices towards war and peace. The vote arguably could not reflect the views of this specific case because the evidence was not available to take a decision, but of the general opinions on foreign policy that were prevalent within parliament at that time.

        Iraq showed the weaknesses in our system, not it’s strengths.

        • March 15, 2013

          William Brett

          Point taken, but I think your argument is with the political philosophers, not me. How to square the requirement for a sovereign/executive (Hobbes) with a democracy?

           
  2. March 15, 2013

    Nigel

    Nigel – there were about 20 times more people on the anti war march than the fox hunting march.

  3. March 15, 2013

    Will Davies

    Fair enough, politics becomes more exciting when the stakes rise. I experienced a similar guilty excitement in the weeks after Lehman Brothers collapsed, as every newsday suddenly felt world-historic in its proportions, even though it was not difficult to guess who would end up paying the worst price (i.e. those most dependent on state expenditure).

    But please recognise the irony in describing Iraq as a triumph for democracy, when the single most powerful force behind the war was an American political movement that is defined by its distrust of democracy, namely neo-conservatism. From the 1930s onwards, the neo-conservative movement has operated outside of the procedures of democracy (and, if necessary, the law) to try and control how US power is used overseas. This exists outside of party politics – neo-conservatives happily support Democratic and Republican regimes equally. This is a nihilistic, Schmittian/Straussian vision of politics, without any notion of citizenship or representation, but only of leadership, power and military strategy.

    I think this article makes a serious error in confusing the term ‘politics’ with ‘democracy’. Politics, as various horrible historical figures have understood all too well, is often most exciting when it is least democratic.

    • March 15, 2013

      William Brett

      Your view – that Iraq was all about US neoconservatism – was given strong representation in the Commons on 18 March 2003. That view very nearly won the day. The fact that it didn’t is surely not an indictment of representative democracy. If the government had lost, the power politics you describe would have been made redundant (in the UK at least).

      I may have conflated politics and democracy a little. But the politics I’m lauding is the representative-democratic kind.

  4. March 15, 2013

    BenSix

    Instead, what I heard was reasonable debate: conviction, mixed with deliberation. The debate in the Commons that day was similarly measured.

    Given that the grounds on which that debates was conducted was a case for the urgency of removing Iraq’s regime that was erroneous in nature and had been dishonest in construction it is hard to draw comfort from this. A debate in which the participants have been given a partial impression of the facts and, indeed, outright disinformation is of limited worth regardless of their behaviour in actualising it. We could have a passionate yet civil discussion about creating a bypass in a stretch of countryside yet if someone had failed to inform us that it was planned to run over an old lady’s cottage it would not be cause for cheer. Substance is more important than tone.

  5. March 17, 2013

    Sykes Mitchell

    This is a glorious piece which blends precision and eloquence with truth and wisdom. You leave me lingering on the pleasant note of vindication, whilst applauding your avoidance of tasteless rhetoric, and restraint in allusions to Penny and Jones where it might have been easy to be barbaric. Their views require a separate dissection but aren’t worthy of this article. I was just 10 when the intervention took place and I am somewhere between disheartened and furious that the case for war as I now see it evaded me so comprehensively. Blair was right, somebody thank him.

  6. March 17, 2013

    Jimmy Tidey

    Surely the way the intelligence community were made part the of campaign in favour of war was less than ideal, as was the way the government was able to mute criticism from the BBC.

    Whatever you think of the way we arrived at the decision to go to war, what happened afterwards was enough to make anyone loose faith. The discovery that there were no WMDs should have triggered the PMs resignation – it was tantamount to the discovery that we’d gone to war by accident.

    Add in the cronyism of promoting John Scarlett – who was responsible for the erroneous dossier – the weirdness around David Kelly, and the lasting impact on BBC journalism and you have a really unpleasant episode.

    A functional debate in the House of Commons doesn’t make me feel much better about it – the context of the debate was absolutely broken.

    • March 19, 2013

      William Brett

      Thanks Jimmy,

      This has been a common criticism of my argument, but I do insist that the system is able to reflect anger and disillusionment based on facts which emerged later. Despite everything you and others mention, Blair retained the support of his party – and the party retained the support of the electorate in 2005. If *everyone* was so upset, how on earth did Labour manage to win?

      I’m not at all uncritical of the decision-making processes before and after the invasion, but I don’t think any of it should be enough to weaken faith in politics and politicians. It was a divisive issue, yet we go on.

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William Brett

William Brett is a researcher and writer on politics, anti-politics and European democracy. Follow him @williamdbrett




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