To discuss this article visit First Drafts, Prospect’s blog
George Mitchell’s first tour of the middle east as President Obama’s envoy in late January came amid stratospheric expectations of the new US administration, Muslim outrage at Israel’s bombardment of Gaza, and election fever in Israel.
But the diplomatic games being played on the Arab stage are of equal significance for Mitchell’s mission. Understanding the rivalries between key regional players will be crucial to achieving progress between Israel and the Palestinians.
For much of the 20th century, the struggle to be at the heart of regional diplomacy tended to be fought out between the revolutionary Arab nationalist regimes, headed up by Egypt, and the more conservative “oil monarchies” of the Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia. Yet Egypt and Saudi Arabia, once bitter rivals, tend nowadays to see eye to eye on regional issues. Both are deeply wary of the Palestinian militant group Hamas. Saudi Arabia worries about the group’s ties to its arch-rival, Iran. Meanwhile, Egypt’s President Mubarak is very aware of the group’s origins in Egypt’s outlawed opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. Cairo is also keen on stability and, along with Riyadh, wishes to see the besieged Gaza strip under the control of the Palestinian Authority, dominated by the Fatah movement of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.
It is a stance that has won them little support among an Arab public outraged by Israel’s invasion of Gaza and increasingly supportive of Hamas. When, in late December, Hamas began firing homemade rockets into Israel following the expiry of a six-month ceasefire, it was from Cairo that Israeli foreign minister Tzipi Livni declared, “enough is enough.” Three days later, Israeli airstrikes against Gaza began. Cairo’s perceived green light to the Israeli offensive sparked furious demonstrations and a wave of anti-Egyptian sentiment across the Arab world. On 30th December, hundreds of protesters stormed an Egyptian consulate in Yemen, throwing computers from windows and burning Egyptian flags. It was an unprecedented condemnation of another Arab state’s foreign policy.
In the past, Mubarak’s difficulties may have worked to the advantage of his rivals in Riyadh. But the Saudi regime, which wants to sign out of the Arab-Israeli conflict and concentrate on countering Iran, also wishes to stifle Iran’s protégés: Hamas and the Lebanese Shia militant group Hizbullah. Hizbullah’s popularity soared in the aftermath of its “victory” over Israel in southern Lebanon in 2006, and street demonstrations across the Arab world in support of Hamas suggest that the movement has enjoyed a similar boost from the Gaza campaign.
This surge in support for the militancy of Hamas is a blow for Cairo’s diplomatic efforts throughout the Gaza campaign, to reclaim its place at the heart of regional diplomacy by negotiating a ceasefire between Gaza and Jerusalem. It is also a barrier to the Arab Peace Initiative, which offers Israel full recognition from Arab states and security in exchange for a return to the country’s pre-1967 borders. Presented to the Arab League in 2002 by King Abdullah, then crown-prince of Saudi Arabia, the plan was endorsed by Arab leaders at the time.
But the fact is that these Saudi and Egyptian efforts have failed to protect the Palestinians of Gaza and are seen by many in the Arab world as directed by the interests of America and ultimately, Israel. This has opened the field to competition from an unusual source: the tiny Gulf state of Qatar.
The country, home of satellite news channel Al Jazeera has begun to play a role in Arab diplomacy far out of proportion to its diminutive size, helped by robust economic growth thanks to its exports of natural gas. In the early days of January, as Egypt tried to claw back some popular credibility by negotiating a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, Qatar convened a high-profile summit of middle eastern leaders, including Hamas leader-in-exile Khaled Mishaal and the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Mubarak and the Saudi King Abdullah boycotted the summit, claiming that a meeting held while the Arab world was so deeply divided over the response to Israel’s offensive in Gaza would be unproductive. Yet it went ahead without them and six other states seen as belonging to the “pro-western” camp—Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain and Kuwait.
The delegates who did attend included the leaders of the more radical Arab countries such as Syria, Algeria, Sudan and Oman. They declared their various intentions to cut off trade relations, diplomatic ties and in Syria’s case, the tentative peace talks it had been holding with Israel under Turkish auspices. (Meanwhile, tens of thousands of Turks took to the streets to denounce the war, and gave Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan a hero’s welcome after he warned Israel’s leaders that they would be “cursed” for the children they had killed.)
Such posturing was far more in tune with the Arab street than Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s late, lukewarm expressions of disapproval at Israel’s action. For Qatar, the Doha summit was a public relations coup—even more so when Israel subsequently bypassed Egyptian attempts to negotiate a truce and unilaterally announced a ceasefire after 23 days of fighting in Gaza. On top of that, Cairo’s continued refusal to open the Egypt-Gaza border crossing at Rafah, allowing aid into the strip, smacked of compliance with Israel. By the end of January, rebuilding Egypt’s reputation in the Arab world looked as big a task as reconstructing Gaza.
Although Senator George Mitchell favoured visiting Cairo over Doha during his January tour, this was little more than a consolation prize for the embattled President Mubarak, while it was Doha’s incumbent, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani, who emerged clearly strengthened by the Gaza episode.
Much will now depend on how Mitchell responds to these changing realities in the Arab world. His appointment is a strong signal that Obama intends to break with the middle eastern policy pursued by President Bush; and this may well include dismantling the Bush-sponsored quartet on the middle east, a foursome of the US, Russia, the EU and the UN which has been overseeing moribund negotiations since 2002. The dissolution of the quartet could potentially breathe life into the Egyptian and Saudi-backed Arab Peace Initiative. President Obama allegedly told Mahmoud Abbas in August 2008 that the Israelis would be “crazy” not to accept it.
If Mitchell supports the Arab plan he may strengthen Saudia Arabia and Egypt against the rejectionists of the Doha camp, such as Syria, which has called for it to be scrapped. But now the radical axis has been boosted by Doha-sponsored diplomacy, this outcome is far from guaranteed. Facing continued public pressure and emboldened regional rivals, moderate Arab leaders may find it increasingly difficult to be moderate. The knotty issue of inter-Arab competition will prove crucial to the outcome of Mitchell’s negotiations; for the sake of peace, it can only be hoped that he understands what he is dealing with.
To discuss this article visit First Drafts, Prospect’s blog
Share
Comments
Print
