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Power’s world: How not to deal with Russia

Jonathan Power  —  18th August 2008

That bar, the Red Star, on the far side of eastern Europe is closed. So why is the Black Star on this side still open, and even extending its drinking hours?

Once the Warsaw pact closed shop there was no good or honest reason for keeping Nato going. The threat it was created to deter disappeared when the Soviet Union collapsed. Let the EU take the strain, by trade, investment, diplomacy and political intimacy, the hallmarks of a successful union that has mastered the art of expansion and influence by clever use of the carrot, while America has led its quest for influence by application of the Bush doctrine of “preventive war.”

As Mark Leonard wrote in Why Europe Will Run the 21st Century, his clever little book of three years ago, “the contrast between the two doctrines is stark. The Bush doctrine attempts to justify action to remove a ‘threat’ before it has a chance of being employed against the US. It is consequently focused very closely on physical assets and capabilities, necessarily swift in execution and therefore short term in conception, and unavoidably entirely military in kind. The European doctrine of pre-emption, in contrast, is predicated on long-term involvement, with the military just one strand of activity, along with pre-emptive economic and legal intervention, and is aimed at building the political and institutional basis of stability, rather than simply removing the immediate source of threat.” This is why Nato is no longer needed in Europe.

Passive aggression—the outward expansion of the Eurosphere—is what Europe needs. For countries such as Turkey, Serbia or Bosnia, the only thing worse than having the Brussels bureaucracy descend on its political system with its multitude of new rules is to have its doors closed to them.

When Nato expansion was first being discussed by the Clinton administration, a group of conservative foreign policy experts, led by Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to George Bush Sr, wrote in the New York Times, “antagonism is sure to grow if the alliance extends ever closer to Russia… We will have misplaced our priorities during a critical window of opportunity.” George Kennan described it as “the most fateful error of the entire post-cold war era.”

Mikhail Gorbachev said that he was assured by James Baker, US secretary of state, that if the Soviet Union permitted the reunification of West and East Germany, “there would be no extension of Nato’s current jurisdiction eastward.” Gorbachev’s words have the ring of truth. Why at that time would a Soviet president voluntarily concede such an important piece of the chessboard without a reasonable quid pro quo? Jack Matlock Jr, the American ambassador in Moscow at the time, has confirmed the deal, “When Gorbachev and others say that it is their understanding Nato expansion would not happen, there is a basis for it.”

The US has rolled all over that commitment, with a supine EU going along with it. Not only is Nato right up to Russia’s borders, US troops are now to join the Polish military to operate an American Patriot anti-missile battery right on Russia’s front lines. If, as the White House has long maintained, its anti-missile system is only directed at Iran, why has it announced this new agreement with Poland in the week that Russia invaded Georgia?

Europe has missed an important beat with Georgia. It should not have allowed the US to set the pace, pulling Georgia into its embrace, aggressively pushing the homeland of Stalin to be made a member of Nato.

Nicolas Sarkozy has done much to redeem Europe’s position, rushing in the first hours of the Georgian crisis to Moscow and securing a peace deal, whilst Bush still dozed at the Olympics. This needs to be followed up by a dramatic realignment of Europe’s eastward stance. An offer of membership negotiations to both Ukraine and Georgia, with a reaffirmation of the goal, as carefully spelt out by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his Prospect interview with me, that one day Russia too will be invited to join the EU. This is what Ukraine and Georgia both badly need, and the present leaders of their countries do them a bad service by emphasising their military needs rather than their social, economic and legal.

At the moment the plan is to start Ukraine’s Nato accession talks in December. Unless Europe wants to be party to laying the ground work for a re-ignition of the cold war, it should veto this and concentrate on expanding the Eurosphere.

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Comments (3):

  1. Mr. Power, If I really believed that the failure of Russia to produce a liberal class of thinkers and politicians stemmed from US duplicity in connection with NATO membership, then I would take your position more seriously. Are we to believe that Russia would have charted a different course this decade had only NATO disbanded? I don’t believe it, and apparently, neither do most Central and Eastern Europeans.

  2. John Kelly says:

    It’s an interesting speculation about NATO, but I’m not sure the EU can do much about a resurgent Russia fuelled by sovereign energy and revenge. I agree that the Gorbachev points ring true. When I interviewed Agenbegyan (a Georgian, by the way) in 1989 he predicted that Russia would concede the Baltic and Caucasus states but only on the condition that they remained militarily non-aligned. The Polish (and Czech) SDI missile sitings have everything to do with re-igniting tensions with russia. What would happen if the latter decided to site missiles in, say, Cuba, for ’strategic purposes?’ We already know the answer.

    I doubt if Russia will become any more ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic’ but it is absolutely certain that brainless bellicosity can only damage European security while doing nothing to expand the US sphere of influence. If it keeps its promise and withdraws, Russia has handled this situation adroitly and decisively. And the EU, for once, has done a good job.

  3. Rick says:

    You sound jolly clever, Mr Powell. But I wouldn’t place too much credence in this kind of ‘what if’ reasoning. Even if one concedes that opportunities to tame the Bear with distant honey pots have been missed, that opportunity having been missed, there’s no reason to believe it can be brought to life again. Your line of reasoning seems paved with good intentions; and we all know where they lead.