In early February, US commanders in Afghanistan thought they had finally cornered al Qaeda. Since the fall of Kabul in November, American forces had played a game of cat and mouse with guerrillas in the southern mountains, unable to bring them to battle. Now intelligence showed al Qaeda units had gathered in strength in the Shahikot valley, a steep-sided gorge close to the Pakistani border. Best of all, from the point of view of US commander Major General Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck, the decisive battle would go to the army, rather than their rivals, the Marine Corps. The Marines had taken combat honours the previous year, with an assault on Kandahar. Now it was the army’s turn.
The build-up took weeks. This was the legacy of Washington’s decision, early in the war, not to commit mainstream ground troops to the war in Afghanistan. The policy was only overturned when it became clear that, following the capture of Kabul, the Taleban and al Qaeda remained a threat. But it would take many weeks to fly in infantry units, supplies and their heavy equipment.
The plan was simple: Afghan units, backed by US air power, would attack from the eastern ridgeline while US forces would land at seven points to the west. The Afghans would seize the ridge, driving al Qaeda across the valley and up the western slope-straight into the guns of the waiting Americans (the operation was named Anaconda, after the giant snake that wraps itself around its prey). Throughout the preparations, al Qaeda forces stayed obligingly in place. But Hagenbeck had other problems. His own division, the 10th Mountain, would lead the assault, yet despite its name, its troops lacked the fitness for high altitude fighting. Another problem was the lack of artillery. Artillery was seen as “old war” in an army now in thrall to the possibilities of high-tech gear. In the Gulf and Kosovo, air power had achieved decisive victories at little cost to friendly forces (the US-led coalition won the Kosovo war without a single combat death). In the early days of the Afghan war, US jets had blasted Taleban positions on the flat open plains. But now the terrain was different.
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